PAKISTAN ODYSSEY

KAMAL AZFAR

National Committee
for Birth Centenary Celebrations of
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah

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INTRODUCTION

CONCEPTS exist in human minds. The concept of Pakistan is no exception to this rule. Nor can it be denied that although the concept is distinct, there has been a difference of emphasis from one person to another, one period to another. More fundamentally, there may be subconscious factors in the evolution of the concept. The ambitions of the political leaders, prejudices, cultural reactions, chauvinism and anti-chauvinism—all play a part in human actions and reactions. Certainly, the lack of communication between the Viceroys Linlithgow and Wavell and the leaders of the Congress, Muslim League and the Chamber of Princes appears in retrospect to have been nothing short of an iron curtain.

In this territory of history, in this space of time, there is need to tread warily. No more than hypotheses may be ventured. At the same time it may be pointed out that the concept itself does not form the only substratum of Pakistan.

Pakistan is a contiguous territory. Most of its people have a common culture. Pakistan is one economy. It has one river system which provides the water needed from Khyber to Karachi to its agriculture and industry, to its peasants and workers alike. It has one national language commonly understood and widely spoken. English too is a unifying factor. Thus the factors which led to separation from India do not provide the only logic for its continued existence just as the reasons for a divorce do not provide the only basis for a happy life thereafter. To put it another way, separation was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for fulfilment of Muslim civilization in India.

As we approach the question of the concept of Pakistan, a textual appraisal of the beliefs of those who held the concept is essential. As the Muslim League was the political party which organized the Pakistan movement, it would be natural to begin with a chronological account of the views held by the League Presidents in their annual addresses. This would define the universe of discourse within which the concept is found; the waters in which the pearl rests.

Chapter I of this book is a historical narrative of the genesis of the concept. The views held by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Allama Iqbal and Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah also are of fundamental importance as they were the leaders of the movement for the Muslim renaissance: in the arenas of education, political consciousness and territory, respectively. Their views are quoted in this chapter. Chapter II deals with the question of Islam and Science. Chapter III is a theoretical analysis of the fundamental philosophical question of National Identity. Chapter IV specifies the problems of the new State. Chapter V defines the present situation in Pakistan and the task before the Pakistanis.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

EVOLUTION OF MUSLIM LEAGUE'S CONCEPT OF PAKISTAN

AT the inaugural session in Dacca in December 1906, it was decided that a political association styled as the All-India Muslim League be formed with three objects:

(a) to promote among the Musalmans of India feelings of loyalty to the British government ;

(b) to protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Musalmans of India ;

(c) to prevent the rise among the Musalmans of India of any feelings of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the objects of the League.[1]

In introducing the resolution, the Nawab of Dacca, Sir Salimullah, had observed : "India is on the eve of a new era—a Mohammedan awakening from coma. The movement is not new, but the turning point of course is the result of the work of Sir Syed Ahmad."[2]

The first session of the League was held at Karachi in December 1907 spanning the distance from the delta of the Ganges draining into the Bay of Bengal, where its inaugural session had been held, to the delta of the Indus draining into the Arabian Sea. Karachi and Dacca were both near the circumference of Muslim India at that time. Sir Adamjee Peerbhoy, the President of the first session, was a philanthropist who had made a donation of more than a lac of rupees for the establishment of a science college at Aligarh. Thus, right from the start, the League was dominated by the modernisers having close links with the Aligarh Movement.

At that moment the driving force of Muslims was for a place in the sun of the British empire, a sun which never set and was indeed at its high noon. In order to secure a rightful place for the Muslims in his speech at the first session, Sir Adamjee emphasized industrialism in these words: "Whatever we may have lacked in recent times in purely literary accomplishments, no one can charge the Mohammedan with not doing his fair share of the world's work. In India he has shown his special aptitude for industrialism and I believe it is along these lines that he can best exert his influence and carve for himself a high position in the Empire...The history of the British people shows that industrialism leads the way and on that foundation they have laid the superstructure of the arts."[3]

Thus, the motivating force of modernisation—and then, before the colonial protest, Sir Syed and his followers recognised no distinction between modernisation and westernisation—was a propelling force of the Muslim League. Another factor was special representation, and Sir Adamjee's presidential address expressed "every satisfaction" at the government decision to "safeguard the interests of the Muhammedans by providing class representation."[4] that is, by reserving four seats in the Imperial Council. In advancing its claims for better representation in government service as well, the President pointed out that one of the purposes of the League was to prevent the rise of hostile feelings between the communities. The League's attitude to the other communities was not aggressive. "We respect", he said, "all those who work for the common good of the country."[5]

The League session continued at Aligarh and among 31 members present or elected on March 18-19, 1908, ten were Barristers; the majority advocates. Thus, in its class composition also, the League was[6] dominated by the newly educated Western intelligentsia—the products of British education.

In his presidential address at the second session of the League at Amritsar in 1908, Syed Ali Imam dwelt at length on the Hindu-Muslim question. He pointed out that for all its "numerical inferiority" the Muslims of India occupied a unique position. He said: "Islam is expansive; it has the capacity to hold all nations in its embrace. Hinduism inculcates a tenacious adherence to a fate that is not proselytising; that has encased itself within the rigidity of the caste system and that has no catholicity. To be a Hindu one has to be born one. Birth imposes no limitation on the Muslim...The two communities from the truly social point of view are as far apart today as they were a thousand years ago..."[7]

Noting that the attempts at political unification by Akbar through tolerance, and by Aurangzeb through the "desperate and hazardous method" of religious intolerance had both failed, he said: "There must be something imperishable in the cherished beliefs of both...Indeed there is much in Hinduism that evokes admiration. It is indestructible. It is perfect and complete in itself. It is a magnificently organized system..."[8]

Syed Ali Imam recognized that it was the British educated elite who were now seeking the application of democracy in India. "The minds of close upon three generations of the educated classes in the land have been fed on the ideas of John Stewart Mill, Milton, Burke, Sheridan and Shelley, have been fed with the great lessons obtainable from the chapters of the constitutional history of England, and have been influenced by inexpressible considerations arising out of the American War of Independence, the relation of Great Britain with her colonies, and last, though not the least, the grant of autonomy to the Boers...It is the English who have carefully prepared the ground and sown the seed that has germinated into what some of them are now disposed to consider to be a noxious weed."[9]

At the time that the British conquered India, both Britain and India were monarchies. In 1832, the first Reform Act ushered in for Britain what is known as the Age of Reforms. This was to be followed by the rise of the utilitarian philosophers Bentham and Mill most prominent of all. Laissez-faire economics and the definition of morality as the greatest happiness of the greatest number was the creed of the nineteenth century liberals. In this hedonistic calculus no distinction can be made between man and man. The much-criticized Macaulay and other English liberals like Montagu at least recognized that all human beings were equally entitled to benefit from these utilitarian ethics.

Thus, the enfranchisement of the British people and that of India continued side by side. It was not until 1921, after the 1909 and 1919 reform in India, that universal suffrage was introduced in Britain. In 1857, it was Her Majesty who took power from Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar but when power was transferred back it was a constitutional King who assented to the Independence Act on the advice of Clement Attlee to transfer power to Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Jawaharlal Nehru—both of whom were educated in England and thought and wrote in English.

The differences in the Hindu and Muslim social systems to which Syed Ali Imam refers continued to exist because the influence of 19th century liberalism was only skin deep. It was nevertheless true that the liberals were beginning to lose ground in Britain. Over the question of Irish Home Rule the Liberal Party had split, giving rise to the union of conservatives and Unionists. Gladstone's advocacy of Irish Home Rule was a voice in wilderness as twilight deepened on the 19th century. The lack of understanding between the liberals in England and the nationalists in India and Ireland may have been causative factors in delaying the introduction of self-government in India, as in Ireland. It is only English which perhaps could have

managed the cultural homogeneity which Ireland and India lacked. As a result, both were partitioned and therefore there must be a factor in England itself which led to partition both in Ireland and India. The partition of India was the second partition adopted by the British Parliament. Ireland's partition had occurred first. Both partitions were induced by social stratification based on faith and language.

* * *

IN India the failure of the British to wreck the caste system was the fundamental cause of Muslim separatism, whose necessary outcome was partition. British policy with regard to caste may have been engineered by a variety of reasons. Caste divisiveness made the British conquest possible; its perpetuation allowed the British to rule as a super-caste. The Aryan invaders had developed this system to consolidate their invasion. Caste made permanent the Aryan invasion of India. It was a social apartheid with a moral sanction. Caste had not merely the legislative sanction of a minority but was imposed by religious myths, occupational distribution of labour, and mind control of the original inhabitants of India so that each caste accepted its fate as what it merely deserved.

In his letters to the *New York Times*, Karl Marx emphasized that caste exclusiveness was one of the primary conditions which made the British conquest possible. He talks of an India divided into a myriad of disorganized units. "We must not forget", Marx wrote, that India consisted of "little communities contaminated by distinctions of caste and slavery, that they subjugated man to external circumstances instead of elevating man to be the sovereign of circumstances, that they transformed a self-developing social state into a never-changing natural destiny, and thus brought about a brutalizing worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in the fact that man, the sovereign of nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of Hanuman

the monkey; and Sabbala, the cow. England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindoostan, is actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England, she is the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution."[10]

That caste is a prison and class is a system of rewards is the verdict of V.S. Naipul on post-independence India, a description not dissimilar from Karl Marx's India "contaminated by caste" and caught in a vicious net of "never-changing destiny". Inasmuch as caste preordains the occupational structure of the labour force and predicates productive activity, it was due primarily to the caste system that India never emerged from a feudal, overpopulated, under-employed society and failed to experience a bourgeois industrial revolution. Large-scale industrial production was a type of activity unknown at the time the Codes of Manu were drawn up. The Hindu social system did not allow for a caste of industrial workers. In order to create a class of industrial workers the caste barriers had to be broken first. Thus, without the demolition of the caste system, the industrial revolution could not take place.

It was left to the outsiders, the invaders, to engage in activities not provided for in the Hindu caste system. During the Muslim rule it was the state that ran *karkhanas*. Later in the Muslim period it was the Europeans who started manufacturing units. Thus, the caste system was eroded by outsiders. In that sense both the Muslim and Christian conquerors of India played a progressive role in introducing industrialism. Their biggest error was that they were too tolerant in this respect because they were doing no service to the poor masses of India in allowing their subjection to the greatest tyranny of all time, the social structure

of Hindu society. The Aryan conquest was an imperialism internalised and enforced in a sense that Durkheim understood through invading the mind of man and making a religious principle of human inequality.

Gandhi brought out a journal called the "Harijan", describing the untouchables as the sons of God. Some say he feared that if the scheduled caste combined with the Muslims, the domination of India by Hinduism would be threatened. While the unity of the people of India required the destruction of the Hindu social system, Gandhi wanted the reform of Hinduism so that it need not be destroyed. Indian politics, even the politics of the communist party of Kerala, revolves round caste and Namboodirapad admitted as much. It is not the lowest caste but the second from the top which was the[11] mainstay of the Communist Party of Kerala in its ride to power. In this context the CPI was a party led by social reactionaries. It can hardly have read its Marx. The Communist Party of India is not known for a war on the caste system, for that would mean attacking Hinduism.

Objectively speaking therefore the greatest obstacle to the progress of the people inhabiting British India was the social system preordained by Hinduism and the superstructure accompanying it. Hinduism is the religion of human inequality. Islam is the religion of human brotherhood. In attacking Hinduism therefore Islam played a progressive role in history, even on Marxist criterion. Unfortunately, the Muslim and Christian rulers of India were too tolerant and failed to free the people of India from the bondage of Hinduism.

Seen in this context it is not surprising that the Muslim League movement was informed by ideas of modernization. The cosmogony of Islam and Christianity have much more in common with each other than either has with Hinduism, which has a different

universe of discourse. The myth of Gilgamesh developed over time into Judaism and Christianity. Islam itself came to perfect the Judaic and Christian civilizations of the past, not to suppress them. In E.M. Forster's "Passage to India" one finds that communication between Englishmen and Muslims was better than between the British and Hindus. Thus, it is not surprising that modernization and civilization are a constant refrain in the Muslim League's evolution. Its leaders made no secret of their admiration for British industrialism and political institutions. The Anglo-Muhammedanism of Sir Syed[12] was the main theme of his inspiring life. He even went to the extent of translating the Bible in order to demonstrate that the Holy Quran and the Bible "convey essentially the same message".[13]

The aspect of English life Sir Syed was keen to borrow was the scientific attitude. Formation of the Translation Society, followed by the Scientific Society, presaged his early forays into the field of Education. He wished to see English books on science and economics translated into simple Urdu ; a language of which he was one of the early exponents. Thus, when the Hindi-Urdu controversy, i.e., that Deonagari script replace the Persian in lower courts, first raised its ugly head in Benaras in 1867, Sir Syed was perturbed. Twenty-one years later he wrote to Babu Prashad protesting that the agitation did not arise from any genuine feeling; that it would make no difference whether the language was called Urdu or Hindi but if by the expression "original language of Hindoostan" they, the Hindus, meant something else than it should be remembered that the "original language" was no longer in use".

The character of the Muslim League, therefore, was from its very inception Muhammedan-Anglo-Oriental—the name of the College founded in Aligarh. This interface between the Muhammedan-

oriental tradition and the English connection represented the cultural renaissance of Aligarh. Aligarh, modelled on the lines of Oxford and Cambridge, was a place where East met West. It was Aligarh which filled the ranks of the League and led to Pakistan. Thus, the Pakistan movement was not the movement of the traditionalists among the Muslims but those who were modern among them.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was such an unabashed admirer of western ways that he went to the extent of opposing the formation of an oriental university in Punjab. Oddly enough, Ghalib, the greatest Urdu poet of all time, was one of the modernists too, for when the young Sir Syed had requested for some words for his revised edition of Aain-e-Akbari, Ghalib had replied that it was not the "inventions and innovations of Akbar and Abul Fazl which deserved to be exhibited or admired but those of the British".[14]

True, Sir Syed was not merely a leader of the Muslim renaissance. He was concerned about the lack of communication between the ruler and the ruled. Sir Syed looked at the Hindu opposition to Urdu as a kind of reversal, a reaction; a rejection of the finest product of many centuries of Indian civilization. It was at this time that he told his old friend Alexander Shakespeare that he saw two nations arising; and the gulf widening between the two of them. Thus, the Urdu language became an important element in Muslim separatism.

Sir Syed led nothing short of a cultural revolution among the Muslims against a backdrop of extreme reaction. He had to defend what is commonplace now—eating with the English, wearing socks and shoes. Sir Syed recognized that the Muslims would have to give up many Hindu customs and usages in order to be ready for civilization. He felt that Islam was compatible with modern civilization if cleansed of un-Islamic customs. He recognized that the Muslims "will have to think of filling their stomachs"

and he wished to "inspire in the dreamy minds of the people of the East the practical energy which belongs to those of the West."[15]

It is no accident that a succinct statement of the origins of the Muslim renaissance is to be found in the foundation stone laying ceremony of the Aligarh College on 8th January 1977. That foundation was the first step on Muslim India's long march to modernity. A hundred years from that day it continues to remind us of our national genesis. "You will, I am sure", said the Viceroy Lord Lytton in his address, "be the last to admit that anything in the creed of Islam is incompatible with the highest form of intellectual culture. *The greatest and most enduring conquests of the Muslim races have all been achieved in the fields of science, literature and arts*.....................in an age when the Christian societies of Europe had barely emerged out of intellectual darkness and social barbarism, they covered the whole of the Iberian Peninsula with schools of medicine; of mathematics and philosophy, far in advance of all contemporary science. But Providence has not confined to a single race a permanent initiative in the direction of human thought or of social life. The modern culture of the West is now in a position to repay the great debt owned by it to the early wisdom of the East. It is to the activity of western ideas and the application of western science that we must now look for the social and political progress of this Indian empire."[16]

* * *

ALL divisions are somewhat arbitrary, but it is perhaps convenient to divide the history of the Muslim League into two parts; from 1906 to 1929 and from 1930 till Partition. There are several reasons which recommend this division. The Allahabad session in 1930 was the twenty-first session of the Muslim League — when it came of age, having passed through its infancy and adolescence.

Before 1930, the concerns expressed by the League were within the compass of a larger Indian unity repeatedly declared. As late as 1924 the Muslim League President in his Presidential Address stated : "Fellow-members, amidst the din and discord and dissension, there is one great unifying influence of which the country ought to take the fullest advantage. And that is the presence of Mahatma Gandhi...........It was he who realized that a common language is a potent factor in bringing about nationalism. His choice has fallen on Hindustani or Urdu, and the country endorses this choice."[17] A year later, Sir Abdur Rahim advocated a common language for India called Hindi, but in the Arabic script. This search for a "composite culture"[18] is mentioned in the reception address of the Delhi session as "a happy and progressive Indian nation (as distinguished from Hindu nation) which should draw upon what is best in each of the several cultures which have found their way into the country".[19] As late as 1928 we find Sarojini Naidu asking the Hindus at the League session to see the great democratic spirit of Islam and the great metaphysical spirit of Hinduism mingle to make Indian nationhood."[20]

Thus, two forces were at work in the 1920's—the centripetal and centrifugal. The problem of the unity of India, of one Indian nationhood, was a problem in the minds of the Hindu majority. Gandhi tried to work for a common approach on culture and his participation in the Khilafat movement also helped the centripetal forces. But in his heart of hearts he was a Hindu revivalist—one of those who wanted to turn back the clock of history. He did not want to destroy the caste exclusiveness but to reform it. Akhtar Hussain Raipuri states how Gandhi called for a conference of workers in Nagpur to reverse his decision that the common language of India would be Hindustani or Urdu in favour of Hindi in the Deonagari script. In the meanwhile the Shuddhi and

Sangathan movements had raised their ugly head in the 1920's.

This ambivalence in the Hindu majority created the Muslim dilemma whether to seek unity through submission or survival through partition.

In the same address in which Sir Abdur Rahim advocated a common language, Hindi in the Arabic script, he said : "A mighty spiritual chasm separates the 230 millions of Hindus not only from the 70 millions of Indian Muslims, but from the rest of humanity. While it divides the Hindus themselves internally into groups which know no social commerce with one another, Caste, with its cruel doctrine of untouchability, has survived many a social convulsion. It has baffled all the efforts of Buddha and Asoka and Akbar." He bemoaned "the mischievous activities of a certain class of Hindu politicians, who appeal to the lower instincts of a community governed by the lower level of passions and prejudices constantly pulling at the higher tendencies. . . . . I refer to the Shuddhi, the Mahasabha and the Sangathan movements".[21]

It was the Muslim League which repeatedly offered a cultural synthesis. Urdu, the developing lingua franca of India represented this synthesis of a society where all mixed ; for combine they could not. It was the common currency of a plural society. Nor was it fastened upon India during the period of Muslim ascendancy when Persian was the language. Urdu was the language which grew during the twilight of Muslim rule. This language even today is a patent cultural expression of what is common in the culture of the subcontinent. It is the language of the screen, the largest spectator activity of the people who live in the subcontinent.

It was the Muslim minority which preferred a cultural synthesis; it was the Hindu majority which replied with cultural exclusiveness. Shuddhi and Anandmath, the Mahasabha and Bande Mataram, Lala Lajpat

Rai and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya all represented the same streak of historical revenge and the imposition of an artificial language and culture on the Indian people—which has in fact taken place in India. The origin of the two-nation theory was in the minds of the Hindu majority. It was the physical law of gravitation, the centrifugal tendency, the schizoid approach to India—seeking its unity but taking steps to its division, which informed the Hindu political scene.

During the 1920's the League continued to profess one-nation theory, but based on a composite culture. The final break came on the question whether India was to have a composite culture or a Hindu revivalist culture, whether its history would be accepted or the revenge for Somnath would be its driving force. The Muslim League's vision of a composite culture was rejected by the Congress, paving the way for the two-nation theory. Perhaps the best definition of this composite culture is to be found in the following words of Sir Abdur Rahim:

"To India's greatness each one of these peoples has contributed. The Dravidians and the Aryans have to their credit a magnificent system of speculative philosophy and a charming mythological literature. The Scythians are remembered by their gallant descendants, the Rajputs. The Arabs, the Persians and the Mughals have brought to India a religion whose democratic teachings have succeeded in sweeping away the barriers of race and colour from among one-fifth of the human race on three continents of the globe. . . Who can say that the British have contributed nothing of value?. . . . . Their most valuable gifts to India have been science, method and organization."[22]

A country can change everything except its history and geography. The Romanians admit that their culture is Dacio-Roman. Romania, originally inhabited by the Dacians, came under the sway of Latin culture during the period of occupation by the Romans. And yet the Romanians have made no attempt to

change the script from Roman to its original Dacian. Historically, Urdu is a language which is an older Indian language than Hindi.

The modern form of literary Hindi was developed very late, in fact not until the end of the eighteenth century......whereas the *khari boli*, originally the dialect of the Delhi-Meerut area, on which both Hindi and Urdu were based, was developed in the first place under the influence of the Muslims. The first literary language to emerge from it was therefore Urdu, written in the Arabic script, and borrowing an extensive vocabulary from Arabic and Persian. At the same time, in a somewhat simplified form, it gained extensive currency as a non-literary colloquial, and this is still very widely used. On the other hand, literary Hindi, written in the Deonagari alphabet and drawing for vocabulary on Sanskrit, hardly appears at all until the beginning of the nineteenth century.[23]

If the Hindu apostles of Indian unity had proposed Roman instead of Nagari as the script, they could at least have escaped the charge of chauvinism. Thus, historical revenge, reversal versus acceptance of history, progress versus regression, forced conversion versus cultural harmony polarized the plural and centrifugal forces into two nations during the 1920's. It was a period of conservative reaction in British politics too. The Liberal Party had declined beyond recovery and the Labour Party had yet to fill the gap. Time lost in the 1920's allowed the strengthening of forces eroding the prospects of unity.

Included in the Simon Commission appointed in the late 1920's was a young Labour Party M.P., Clement Attlee, who, later as Prime Minister of India, would give it Independence—one of the few moral acts in political history. Irrespective of the pressure of circumstances there is no doubt that Attlee could have postponed Independence by a few years. The Labour Party attitude to Independence can be gathered from

a speech made by a member of the Party addressing the Muslim League in 1928 who said he belonged to a group that held, in the words of Mr. Lansbury, that God had not made one nation fit to rule another. Good government was not a substitute for self-government. Every people had something to contribute to the world's progress, if allowed self-determination."[24]

The record of the proceedings of the Muslim League between 1906 and 1928 show the following main trends in the Party: to encourage feelings of loyalty to the British Government; to protect the interests of the Muslims by representation in Government service and in elective bodies ; to work for inter-communal harmony ; to advance the cause of Urdu as the lingua franca of India ; to seek separate electorates ; to support the separation of Sind from Bombay; to express solidarity with Muslims throughout the world ; to inculcate unity of India and to co-operate with Congress in its search for Swaraj ; to develop India economically and industrially as a modern state.

These are the main trends. A brief survey of the Presidential addresses and speeches will help not only to substantiate this analysis but to understand the evolutionary process. The high point of League-Congress combination was in 1916 when the session of both Parties was held in Bombay and a Committee appointed on each side to come to an agreement on constitutional issues. This was the period when India was moving from the first Reforms of Morley-Minto to the second Reforms of Montague - Chelmsford in 1919—very near the swan song of British liberalism.

These first Muslim voices were quite unabashed in acknowledging the debt that India owed to Britain. They called it the "great liberalising influence of the great British race." At the same time we find rising concern at a kind of nascent Brahmin Nazism. "I ask the architects of Indian nationalism", said Syed Ali

Imam, "do they expect the Mussalmans of India to accept Bande Mataram and the Sewaji celebrations?"[25] Communal tension thickens in the air as the saga of the League proceeds to its inevitable outcome.

At the third session in Delhi in January 1910, Hakim Ajmal Khan, while welcoming the delegates, observed: "British statesmanship, ever characterized by generosity and beneficence, is exerting itself to lead the peoples of this Eastern land, step by step, along the path of political progress on Western lines."[26] In his inaugural address, His Highness the Aga Khan while describing the British raj as "the most liberal raj the world has ever seen" called upon the Muslim members of the Council to cooperate with the Hindus "in advancing the well-being of the country by working wholeheartedly for the spread of education, for the establishment of free and universal primary education, for the promotion of commerce and industry, for the improvement of agriculture. . . and for the development of all the national resources of society".[27] Modernization, economic development and industrialization were common tasks for both communities. "We must concentrate our mind", said the Aga Khan, "on our economic development".[28] In Syed Ameer Ali's speech, which was read at the session, it was stated: "For our own people the question of economic development overshadows all others".[29]

The President of the third session was the first to mention the importance of Urdu as a factor in Muslim unity and Muslim nationalism. "A third way", he said, "of bringing about the desired regeneration of the community is the extension of Urdu as the common vernacular of the Mussalmans in the country. Community of language is universally admitted to be a powerful factor in seeking the unity of a people, and Urdu is pre-eminently fitted to serve this purpose".[30]

The fifth resolution passed by the session underlines the importance of Urdu in the ideology of Pakistan :

"The All India Muslim League deplores the attempts made in certain quarters to damage the importance of Urdu as the principal vernacular of the country and regards the preservation and advancement of the Urdu language and literature as essential for the general progress of the country".[31] In moving the resolution, Maulvi Mahbub Alam remarked that Urdu was the lingua franca of India and that "the development of the Muslim community was synonymous with the preservation of the Urdu language".[32] At the fourth session in Nagpur the reception address stated : "There cannot be a shadow of doubt that Urdu is the lingua franca of India".[33]

Emphasis on economic development is reflected by the following remarks in the same address: "Athen faded away like a fragrant memory because she failed to look to the economic basis of her prosperity. . . . Let our people, as rapidly as possible, be educated in the principles of economics and let special pains be taken for the development of an honest and intelligent class who will be content to organize and manage our industries without sapping their life by demanding exorbitant profits."[34] Self-reliance is also stated to be an objective in the Presidential address.

Apart from another resolution in support of Urdu, the fourth session passed a resolution in favour of making a beginning towards making primary education "free and gradually compulsory throughout the country".[35] According to one participant in the debate, Government expenditure on education throughout India at that time was only one crore and thirty-six lacs where as during the "last few years they have increased the military expenditure by 13 crores, while civil expenditure has gone up by 8 crores. . . . Even Japan spends over 5 crores on primary education.[36] Benign as it may have been in some respects, neglect of primary education and failure to make it free and compulsory was one of the costliest negligences

of the British Raj. Up to the 1930's it was inexpensive enough a proposition to have educated one generation of men and women, and this would have ensured that literacy would be passed on from generation to generation. There were some like Curzon who supported this move, but the opponents of universal literacy prevailed.

Another resolution of the Nagpur session urged the Government "to give to the Muhammedan community that share in the public service to which it is entitled by reason of its importance and numerical strength". The figures quoted showed that only in the revenue and police services was the proportion maintained while "out of 287 sub-judges only 28 are Muslim ; out of 491 Assistant Surgeons only 65 are Mohammedans and out of 149 Engineers only 5 are Mohammedan."[37]

In his presidential address at the seventh session of the League at Agra in 1913, Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola put forward his vision of an India united through its British connection. "I am one of those dreamers who firmly believe that given a sufficiently long spell of British rule in India we are bound to become united as a nation in the real sense of the term. . . . . .India is our motherland, our proud heritage, and must in the end be handed over to us by our guardians. . . . Our policy towards the British[38] government should be one of unswerving loyalty and towards the Hindus one of brotherly love and regard".[39] This amity was reflected in the Lucknow Session where the two principal objects of the League were defined in these terms by the Chairman of the Reception Committee:

"The All India Muslim League stands to day for two principal objects, namely, for the safeguarding of the political position of the Musalmans and for cooperation with other communities for the attainment of self-government or home rule."[40] This was the ideology of the League in 1916.

In his presidential address the Quaid-i-Azam stated : "Peace has its victories. We are fighting and can only fight constitutional battles.... . We are determined to convince the British Empire that we are fit for the place of a partner within the Empire, and nothing less will satisfy India."[41]

In the Reception address at the Calcutta session in December 1917, Western ideas were extolled in these terms : "Following the declaration of policy in 1833, our rulers in India flung wide open the gates of the temple of knowledge, and Indians began to drink deep and with avidity of the fountains of Western learning and culture. Through more than half a century, Indians benefited from the vivifying food of English constitutional freedom. . . . "[42] Thus Westernisation was also part of the ideology of the Muslim League.

By this time the Congress and League had agreed on a common package of reforms following the Bombay session in 1916 when both the Congress and the League met in the same city at the same time. The First World War was at its height and both the exigencies of the war as well as a liberal administration in England hastened the pace of constitutional reform. How different was the scene during the Second World War, with most of the Congress leaders in jail and co-operation between the communities or with the British practically non-existent.

At its special session in 1918 the League passed a resolution to the effect that "the introduction of a system of responsible government should proceed simultaneously in the Central as well as Provincial governments."[43] This was in line with Congress thinking at that time.

Material prosperity was a deep concern of the Muslim League at the end of the First World War ; a part of its ideology. Preservation of Indian Muslim culture epitomised by Urdu and economic development were thus the cultural and material constituents

of the Pakistan movement. The Pakistan movement was a battle for survival : physical, cultural and economic. This three-fold battle for survival was the essence of the Pakistan movement.

While British political liberalism had its admirers in the League, its economics had its critics. Fazlul Haque's speech helps us to distinguish two aspects of liberalism and their impact on the Indian political economy. British political liberalism had a liberalising influence on Indian politics. Though there is a time lag, there is a correlation between the advance of the British people in securing political participation and the Reforms in India. If the Reform Act of 1832 first opened the doors of Parliament to the people of England, it was the Local Government Act of 1882 in India, fifty years later, which was the first step towards democracy. The second half of the nineteenth century was Britain's age of reform for Britain; the first half of the twentieth century was Britain's age of reform for India. At the end, the time lag between sovereign Parliament elected by universal suffrage is about a quarter of a century—1921 in Great Britain and 1947 in India.

On the other hand political liberalism's sister, economic laissez faire, was damaging to India. The reduction in import duties in the 1880's begins to take place about the same time as local self-government is introduced. Free trade was like poison to the Indian industry while political freedom was the legacy of British liberal thought. Thus, the two aspects of liberalism, economic and political, were different from each other; one crushing the prospect of economic development in India, the other encouraging its political development.

A new voice to this effect was heard from A.K. Fazlul Haque, President of the eleventh session held in Delhi in December 1918. He cited the famine figures and quoted Digby as having calculated, roughly speaking, that the famine deaths in the last 30 years of

the 19th century were "four times those that had occurred during the previous century. . . . The poverty of the Indian people has passed into a proverb. The average income of an Indian is less than £ 2 a year, whereas in the U.K., the average income exceeds £ 45 a year. Only about a hundred years ago Bengal was richer than even Britain ; and when in 1757, Clive entered Murshedabad, he wrote that he found the city "as extensive, as populous and as rich as London". Tracing the causes of decline in material prosperity he quoted H. H. Wilson: "British owners of industries and concerns used the Government of India as a political weapon to stifle the ancient industries of Hindustan."[44]

After the First World War, British political liberalism went into a long decline from which indeed it never recovered. The Jallianwala Bagh incident was condemned by the League in its twelfth session in Amritsar in 1919. The war was over. Jallianwala Bagh at best epitomised the ugly mood after the Armistice. "First came the Rowlatt Bill—accompanied by the Punjab atrocities—and then came the strangulation of the Ottoman Empire and Khilafat", said Mohammad Ali Jinnah, President of the Extraordinary Session at Calcutta in 1920. "The one attacks our liberty, the other our faith".[45]

Mr. Jinnah talked of non-cooperation even if it was not the Gandhian variety and at the thirteenth League session held later in 1920 at Nagpur, the President, Dr. Ansari, elevated non-cooperation to a religious principle. He said: "As regards the religious point of view...the Muslim shariat enjoins tark-i-mawalat or abandonment of friendship. . . .with those non-Muslims who are at war with Muslim countries".[46] The reference was to Turkey.

The early 1920's witnessed two phenomena: the high tide of Pan-Islamism in the Muslims and Swaraj (Independence). Rule 2 of the All-India Muslim League was amended at the 1920 Nagpur session with the

attainment of "Swaraj" as its first object instead of promotion of feelings of loyalty to the British. A new object was also added: "To maintain and strengthen brotherly relations between the Musalmans of India and those of other countries."[47] Thus, Pan-Islamism and Nationalism combined in the curious phenomenon of the Congress-League collaboration in the Khilafat movement. It was the only time that Pan-Islamic ideology as such became paramount in the League.

But there are other ways of looking at the Khilafat movement. It was an identification with a Third World country against an imperial power. It was a method of awakening hostility to British rule by an appeal to religious susceptibilities of the people. This appeal to religion or even prejudice as a means of fomenting hatred against the Government did not begin nor indeed did it end with the Khilafat movement. The War of Independence of 1857 was inspired by rumours that the grease on the cartridges supplied to the sepoys was from pig fat or cow fat, depending on whether the soldier was Hindu or Muslim. Sectarian and communal disaffection has continued to be a manner of putting people against the Government. The Khilafat movement too was anti-British. It was anti-imperialist.

Self-determination was the dominant ethos of the period between 1910—1920; violence was its armour. It was a nationalist who started the First World War by assassinating the Grand Duke of Austria. In his address to the special session, Mr. Jinnah referred to Sinn Feinism and to Bolshevism as methods of liberation. India was awake.

The Muslims showed intense nationalism in this hour, and although the Muslim League appeared to be weak at this time it did not derogate from its real importance. "It was the All-India Muslim League", said Hasrat Mohani, the President of the Ahmadabad session in December 1921, "which actually realized the first and most essential condition of Indian

Independence: Hindu-Muslim Unity ; and now that it has been achieved it is the duty of the League to maintain it also."[48] He advocated a Federal solution on the lines of a United States of India. He did not rule out violent revolution and advocated that for the words "peaceful" means to attain independence, "proper" may be substituted. He referred to the two methods of replacing government: "by the sword" or by setting up a "parallel government". Obviously, he was advocating something in the nature of the Soviets. He set the deadline for the attainment of Swaraj within one year—by January 1, 1922. For continued Hindu-Muslim unity engendered by the Khilafat movement, he said, the Muslims should not consider the return of Smyrna as the satisfaction of the Khilafat demands until the minimum demands of Swaraj were satisfied, and Congress should not agree to Swaraj by instalments unless the Khilafat demands were satisfied. It is thus obvious that the Khilafat movement was not an end in itself, but a means to mobilising Muslim India against the British. Besides, the Khilafat demands were not ideological but mainly territorial. The main demand was that Smyrna be made part of Turkey, not that the Caliphate be restored, for already the anti-Khilafat Mustafa Kemal was being referred to as Ghazi in the Khilafat Committee resolutions.

These soaring heights of idealism reached one of their highest expression when Mr. Bhurguri, President of the fifteenth session held at Lucknow in 1923, pleaded for a League of Oriental Nations. "Asia for the Asians has already gained possession of the heart of this continent and so has Africa for the Africans. . . ." he said.[49] In its resolution of that year the League, recognizing the need for "complete unity among the various communities and sects inhabiting India" called for a National Pact. It also passed a resolution that the people of India should participate in "the formation of a Federation of

Eastern countries with the object of mutual help in matters of trade and commerce to free themselves from the economic exploitation and domination by Europe.......”[50]. The idea of the Third World is thus also part of the Pakistan ideology.

The emphasis on Hindu-Muslim unity as a necessary condition for Swaraj was in evidence in 1924 during the continued fifteenth session at Lahore, where it was stated that “the advent of foreign rule and its continuance in India is primarily due to the fact that the people of India, particularly the Hindus and Mohammedans, are not united”. At the same time the resolutions passed at this session emphasized provincial autonomy, separate electorates, and no bill affecting a minority to be passed without the consent of three-fourths of the members of the minority.

Thus, in the 1920’s we find a break in India’s constitutional advance. It was the state of British politics which always did set the pace. Although the 1909 reforms were followed by the 1919 Reforms, it was not till 1935—under a Labour Premier, that the Government of India Act was passed. During this interregnum seeds of political separatism grew. It was indeed political separatism in the Hindus that grew in this period. Early in the 1920’s we find the Khilafat movement as a unifying factor in Indian politics. But in the 1920’s the strident voice of Hindu nationalism, red in tooth and claw, began to appear with the Shuddhi as its banner, Bande Mataram on its lips, and an artificial Sanskritised Hindi as its language. It was a new demon ; it was an old demon. The ghost of exclusiveness and separatism is part of the Hindu, not the Muslim creed. Two forces in Indian history have attempted to meet this challenge, Buddhism and Islam. The sound that comes from the clash of the cymbals is the same either when Buddhism confronts Hinduism, or Islam confronts Hinduism—it is the historic clash of domination colliding with equality.

The line indeed runs from Buddha and Asoka to Akbar and Aurangzeb as Sir Abdur Rahim pointed out. Both Buddhism and Islam place man as the sovereign of nature. Separatism, compartmentalisation, exclusiveness is the legacy of Hinduism. Thus, the problem of separatism and partition was a problem in the mind of Hindu majority. The Indian nation could never become a Hindu nation, and it was the attempt to impose this that led to the rise of Pakistan. It was a Hindu cultural regression which led to Muslim separatism. Muslim separatism was essential in maintaining the culture of India, as it was at the time of the British conquest. Hinduism is the religion of human inequality; Buddhism and Islam are religions of human fraternity and equality. The ideals of the French Revolution, the governing ideals of modern man are incompatible with Hinduism, which permits no liberty of occupation; and admits neither fraternity nor equality. India's unity could have been predicated only upon the concept that all men are born equal, but if Hinduism accepted that it would cease to be Hinduism.

In retrospect, there could have been only two ways in which India could have attained cultural unity. About the only Indians who were culturally homogeneous were the westernised elites. The Macaulay system at least produced a homogeneous elite out of the welter of caste, creeds and cultures that cobwebbed India. In that respect, and in a way that Marx foresaw, England by substituting rationalism for superstition had started the process of a social revolution in India. Those elites, however, were too small and their internal gradation with the Indian Civil Service as the super caste paralleled the exclusiveness of Indian society. Perhaps after greased cartridges occasioned the event of 1857 the British became all too circumspect about changing the Indian social system. Thus, Westernisation did break through exclusiveness though many evil and horribly cruel habits like Sati were

stopped. A Westernised India shed off of its Hindu superstition might then have provided a framework for a nation. The alternative model is also premised upon a non-Hindu solution. Had the Communist Party led India's march to independence one nation was possible, but again at the cost of the Hindu social system. Countries exposed to British rule are particularly immune to Marxism. The reasons for that are the subject of another book.

In an India caught in the cruel embrace of Brahmanic regression the presidential addresses of the All-India Muslim League up to 1929 continue to read like the speeches made at the annual British Party Conferences. In its sixteenth session, the President said: "The role of illustrious Englishmen who devoted themselves to the uplift of our country—Elphinstone, Munro, Canning, Ripon, Minto, Morley and Harding—entitles the British nation to look back with pride on the record of the achievements of these just and broad-minded men."[51]

The impact of the changes in the British political scene are also pointed out with such candour as: "The last three years have seen three successive general elections in England. The Conservative Party has come into power with a huge majority. . . .As a result of the study of the British party system, there had arisen in our countrymen a tendency, which became distinctly noticeable by the early eighties, to treat the liberals as friendly and the Conservatives as hostile to Indian hopes and aspirations."[52]

Reza Ali, the League President of the sixteenth session, then attempts to belie the impression by pointing out that the Act of 1892 was given by the Tories. But this is specious pleading. The conscience of the conservative is to conserve. *Status quo* and not change, is the conservative soul. The brand of Tory radicals which had appeared in the second half of the 19th Century, Disraeli among them, were no more. The union of Conservatives and Unionists

which rode the Tories to power after the first world war had a strong element which was opposed to Irish Home Rule. Indeed it was the breakaway Liberal Unionists led by Joseph Chamberlain, on account of opposition to Gladstone's espousal of Irish Home Rule, who provided the mainstay of the New Tory Party. Joseph's sons, Austin and Neville Chamberlain were to dominate Tory politics in the inter-war years. Lord Birkenhead, the new Secretary of State, was a close collaborator of Churchill in breaking up the General Strike. Massive unemployment during the 1920's and 30's was treated with callous indifference by the rulers of Britain in the inter-war years. Those opposed to British Coalminers or to Irish Home Rule could hardly have been any more sympathetic to Indian Home Rule. Thus, the Liberal connection was extremely important to India in its constitutional advance between 1892 to 1919. Later, the connection with the Labour Party would replace this.

Conservative obstruction to constitutional advance drove the Indian political parties close together and undermined the strength of the League. In December 1927, the Muslim League was facing a dangerous split and was on a slippery road to decline. At the Council meeting held at Delhi on December 11, 1927, only 23 out of 300 members were present. There were two sessions of the League in 1927-28—one of the Jinnah group at Calcutta and one of the Shafi group in Lahore; both had called the nineteenth session. At the Calcutta session Mr. Jinnah spoke with the voice of an Ambassador of Unity. "Jallianwala Bagh was a physical butchery, the Simon Commission is a butchery of our souls. By appointing an exclusively all-white commission, Lord Birkenhead has declared our unfitness for self-government. I welcome Pandit Malavia, and I welcome the hand of fellowship extended to us by Hindu leaders from the platform of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha. . . . Let us then grasp the hand of fellowship. This is indeed a

bright day, and for achieving this unity thanks are due to Lord Birkenhead."[53]

In the same year the Shafi group held a meeting at Lahore. Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan then raised the following demands of the League: separate representation on population basis in elective bodies; separate electorate ; separation of Sind from Bombay ; reforms for the Frontier Province and Baluchistan; and an adequate Muslim share in service. Thus stood the Pakistan movement 11 years before the Lahore resolution.

The importance of the politics of Great Britain for India's advance cannot be denied. Clement Attlee, who gave India its independence, had been a member of a Simon Commission in 1920—30. Thus, the connection with the Labour Party leaders had already begun to take shape in the 1920's and 30's. Oppression of a people has no kinds ; it may have degrees. The Tory governments of the 1920's and 30's were anti-people—anti the British workers as well as the poor masses of India. The Labour governments were pro-people and thus they succeeded in liberating both the British people as also the Indian people. The pace of India's constitutional advance was thus set predominantly by politics in Britain. Cooperation or non-cooperation in India was largely irrelevant. Indeed non-cooperation has become a political attitude of the governed to the government in the post-colonial era. It is only after twins are born that they must part. Two nations, the twins, were conceived in the inter-war years. As the tide of India's constitutional advance ebbed with the historic misrule of Britain and her colonies in the inter-war years, partition became inevitable.

A resolution was moved by Shaikh Abdullah proposing Sir Mohammed Shafi as President, Allama Iqbal as General Secretary and Hasrat Mohani as Joint Secretary. This was opposed by Raja Ghazanfar Ali who stated that Mr. Jinnah was already the President

of the League, to which Sir Mohammed Shafi retorted: "No, Mr. Jinnah is no longer President. He ceased to be President from June 1927 when his term expired." The resolution which related to election of Sir Mohammed Shafi was then passed by acclamation.

At that moment, as the decade of 1920's ended, there were three major issues according to the President of the League at its twentieth session in Calcutta in 1928 : the demand for Independence, the demand for Dominion Status within the Commonwealth, and the question of communal prejudice. He ended with a ray of hope. "I invite you, gentlemen, to give your whole-hearted support to the Dominion Status insisted upon in the Nehru report. As regards the adjustment of differences between community and community, the difference between the Muslim minority and the Hindu majority have narrowed themselves down to issues that are few and not essentials."[54]

Time would show that these high sentiments were not the beginning of an epoch of unity but its swan song. Soon the Ambassador of Unity would become the apostle of division. Soon Motilal Nehru would give way to Jawaharlal Nehru and Maharaja Mahmoodabad to Raja Saheb of Mahmoodabad. The new generation of leaders would deal with an impassioned youth whose tide was swelled by the twin accelerators of India's first population bulge and widening education. The educational system would produce more *babus* than the economic system required—another endemic problem of the post-colonial era. A new voice would be heard at the historic Allahabad session of the League in December 1930. It is the ten years between 1930 and 1940 that the vision of Pakistan crystallized, and here starts a new road in the history of Muslim India—the road that led to Pakistan.

* * *

ANGLO-Oriental-Muhammedan Culture as symbolised by the Aligarh movement was indeed rich. The cultivated Indian Muslim had the benefit of a synthesis between the Arab-Persian civilization and Indian music and dance. Muslim mystics of India gave a singularly indigenous vision of Islam. Praise of Allah was sung with the same devotion as praise of the beloved. Urdu was a result of this cross fertilisation between the genes of Arabic and Sanskrit. Added to this was the exposure to the West. A cultivated Indian Musalman educated at Aligarh could recite Omar Khayyam in Persian and was equally at home writh Fitzgerald's quatrains. Perhaps the biggest sacrifice that he had to pay was in hedonism when he came across the puritan ethics of the Englishmen of the 19th century. Upto the 18th century it was the Britons who succumbed to the epicurean delights of the Indian Muslim culture—hookah, angarkha, mujra and all.

Had the Muslims been in a majority or if the Hindu majority had not sunk into revivalism, regression and revenge, India may not have been divided. Two years before the Allahabad session to which we now turn, the Indonesian youth of Java faced with a similar linguistic crisis had voluntarily given up the sanskritised Javanese script—although they too had superior numbers—for the Roman script in order to seek Indonesian unity through a common language. Simultaneously the Sumatran youth also adopted the Roman script in substitution for the Arabic script in which Sumatran was written. No such move to adopt the Roman script was made by the leaders of India's Hindu majority. The cost of this cultural chauvinism was India's unity. *Pakistan is the result of a contradiction between the superior culture of inferior numbers and the inferior culture of superior numbers.*

Islam's gift to India was a social structure regulated by a legal system orientated by a specific ideal alien to Hinduism—that all men are born equal. If India's

unity was to be preserved, Allama Iqbal said in his address to the 21st session of the All India Muslim League in 1930, then it was necessary to have internal harmony. "I have no hesitation in declaring", he said, "that if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to free and full development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands is recognized. . . . he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India."[55] The Allama then quoted the Nehru report in support of his thesis though personally he said he would like to go further than that. He said: "I would like to see the Punjab, the North West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan consolidated into a single state". With prophetic vision, he added: "The formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India".[56]

He said that his vision was actuated by a desire for free development which was incompatible with desire for "permanent communal dominance" nursed by nationalist Hindu politicians. He noted that the motive behind the Federalism advocated by the "Pandits of England" (the Simon Commission) was different because they were afraid that democracy at the Centre was likely to "absorb the whole power now in their hands" and it was for this reason that the British had shifted the experiment of democracy from the Centre to the provinces. The Nehru report published at that time envisaged a unitary form of Government. Motives apart, an alliance of interests was thus shaping in India between the Muslims and the British, both apprehensive, for different reasons, of a strong centre in Indian, that is, Hindu, hands. It was the experience of the Provincial governments in the 1930's which enhanced the urge for Muslim separatism.

"To my mind", said Allama Iqbal, "a unitary form of government is simply unthinkable in a self-governing India. . . .I would never advise the Muslims of

India to agree to a system. . . .which virtually negatives the principle of true federation.. . . ."[57]

Allama Iqbal agreed that under the Simon proposals Muslims had been unjustly deprived of a clear majority in Punjab and Bengal. He saw no reason why Sind should not be united with Baluchistan and turned into a Province. He visualised the growth of Karachi as the "second metropolis of India".

The Simon Commission appointed on November 18, 1927 elicited different responses from Muslim India. A section of the League headed by Sir Mohammad Shafi favoured cooperation with the Commission, while a section headed by Mr. Jinnah was opposed to the all-white character of the Commission and favoured a co-operation with other national parties. When the Muslim demands for amendments in the Nehru report were rejected at the All-Parties National Convention in Calcutta on 22nd December 1928, it helped pave the way for the reunification of the two factions of the League. The fourteen points prepared by Mr. Jinnah were in the form of a draft resolution circulated at the open session of the League on 28th March 1929 to accommodate the various points of view in the League. The points were:

1. The form of India's constitution to be federal with residuary powers vested in the Provinces.
2. Uniform measure of autonomy to all Provinces.
3. Effectual representation to minorities in all Provinces without reducing the majority to a minority or equality.
4. At least one-third Muslim representation at the Centre.
5. Separate electorates.
6. Territorial readjustment of Provinces not to affect Muslim majorities in Punjab, Bengal and NWFP.

7. Full religious liberty including education.
8. No legislation to be passed if three-fourths or more of the members of any community are opposed to it.
9. Sind to be separated from Bombay.
10. NWFP and Baluchistan to be brought at par with other Provinces.
11. Adequate share of Muslims in services.
12. Constitutional safeguards for the protection of Muslim culture and education, language and personal laws.
13. Cabinets, provincial or central, to have one third Muslims.
14. No changes in the constitution to be possible without concurrence of the States constituting the Indian Federation.[58]

At the conclusion of the address various resolutions were moved, including one that Mr. Jinnah's fourteen points constituted the minimum Muslim demands. *The move was defeated.* Instead the Resolution passed at the All-India Muslim Conference on January 1, 1929, at Delhi presided over by His Highness the Aga Khan was adopted by the League as the basis of Muslim demands.

No account of the evolution of the concept of Pakistan is complete without a reference to the Fourteen Points. It is of historical interest, however, that the points were not adopted by the League as its political programme. The Fourteen Points presented by Mr. Jinnah in 1929 were a reply to the Nehru report with its concept of a unitary Hindu-dominated India. It was the concept of Pakistan in embryo. Allama Iqbal, the architect of the concept, and Quaid-i-Azam who was to give it flesh and blood were drawn towards Muslim territorial separatism about the same time. As the curtain fell on the twenties, the concept of partition of India was conceived.

Despite the Fourteen Points, neither territorial separatism nor the two-nation theory was the accepted League dogma in the 1930's. In December 1931, the Chairman of the Reception Committee for the twenty-second session of the League began his speech with these words : "At the outset I must frankly state that we claim to be and are as much Indians as any other community in India...... but we refuse to recognize the right of any other community to dominate or overawe us."[59] He added : "We must strive in unity to develop a common Indian culture and build a happy and progressive Indian nation, which should be composed of all that is best in the varied cultures that have found their way into India."[60]

The Muslim conquest of India was essentially a cultural conquest. Islam in India was not spread by the sword but by the mystics and the sufis. Were this not true there would today have been preponderant Muslim majorities in the principal seats of Muslim political power. Neither Delhi nor Agra, the twin Muslim capitals, fall within Muslim majority areas, demonstrating that Islam was not spread by force. In his Presidential address in 1933, Ch. Zafrullah said that to the general outlines of the Federal Scheme, nobody could have any objection. He called for the provincialisation of all services and said that the Provinces would be fully autonomous and responsible. Thus, the autonomy issue which was later to sap the efforts at Constitution making in Pakistan, had deep roots in the Muslim League psyche. He defined the Muslims as a nation thus: "Our religious, cultural, social, and, I may add, linguistic unity supplies us with all the essentials that go to form a nation". Thus the basis of Muslim nationalism was modern. When Sir Zafrullah said "all the essentials" he meant the essentials of the definition of a nation in the textbooks of the modern state. The closest parallel was perhaps Ulster and Ireland.

Indeed the difference between Hinduism and Islam was a yawning chasm and not a bridge that divided Protestantism from Catholicism—both aspects of Christianity. Islam is the religion of equality and Hinduism is the religion of social inequality. Islam professed that all men are born equal; Hinduism that all men are born unequal. "We are anxious", said Sir Zafrullah, "to preserve intact all these factors" and he pointed to the disabilities to which "all political minorities are subject."[61]

The preservation "intact" of the glorious Anglo-Oriental-Mohammedan culture of the Indian Musalman was the elan vital of the Muslim League. Through the Muslim League the modern Indian Muslims were building the defensive barriers to protect their language, culture, social values, through constitutional safeguards in the political and bureaucratic system. Islam in India always had its own mystic flavour, its culture, its own music, its own sensuous Arabesque like the warm reflection of the cold marbles of the Taj on a moonlit Jumna night. It is this warm reflection which gave rise to the qawali, the mushaira, and the adaptation of the ragas. Islam did not suppress the sound of the flute nor silence the chords of the sitar. As earlier Islamic culture incorporated all that was best in the Greek classics, Islam in India also came dressed in local costumes. It is this acculturation that gives Islam its universal character. Islam came to perfect civilization, not to suppress it.

Islamic culture in India, the Indian Arabesque, was one of the highest cultural synthesis known to man. At the Darul Musannifeen at Azamgarh, a learned Muslim scholar was schooled in the Sanskrit, Arabic and Greek classics. He was equally familiar with the Dialogues of Plato and the Masnavi of Maulana Rum. If exposed to Western learning, the educated Indian Muslim defied Kipling's maxim that East is East and West is West and never

the twain shall meet—they met in the Anglo-Oriental-Muhammedan culture. Indeed the early Britons in India succumbed to the charms of this high culture mixed with hedonism. Love of life characterized the Muslim court as much as love of letters.

It is a fundamental error that the road to Pakistan was led by the quest for a new Eldorado. Both extreme leftists and rightists suffer from utopianism. This error has led to many mistaken attempts to create an artificial culture to the rejection of music and dance which was part of the Indian Muslim way of life and to the attempt to transplant an arid vision of a desert-like puritanism. Preservation and not change ; survival not metamorphosis was the instinct that led to Pakistan. Abstract ideals lacking flesh and blood were not the way that Islam came to India. It was the wandering mystic and not the dogmatic Mulla, nor the man on horseback, sword in hand, who spread Islam in India. Islam's gifts to India were the "notions of fraternity, equality and justice".[62] The ideology of Pakistan was to preserve and nourish the social order and culture that had evolved in Muslim India, not to destroy and reconstruct.

In the early 1930's, the League was in the doldrums. The Quaid had left for England and taken up practice in the Privy Council. The Muslims were becoming divided. There were two sessions of the League in 1933, one of the Aziz group at Howrah and one of Hafiz Hidayat group at Delhi. By this time the Communal Award and the White Paper (1933) had been issued by the British government. The British government had announced that a Joint Parliamentary Committee would meet and hear objections and upon its report a constitution for India would be submitted to Parliament. The Hindu leaders took the stand that they wanted substantial modifications in the Award and the White Paper.

That it was the intransigence of leaders of Hindu India that left the Indian Muslims with no choice

but to demand Pakistan has been confirmed in many an account—most importantly by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in his book "India wins Freedom" where he accuses Patel and the Hindu diehards for preferring the division of India to an accommodation with the Muslims. But here we find the poignant call of the President of the League in 1933 in describing the opposition of the Hindu leaders to the award as a true picture of the traditional mentality of the Hindus . . . "that they do not want Swaraj or a reformed constitution *unless Hindu Raj throughout is promised to them*".[63]

Muslim nationalism reflected concrete realities and not abstract ideals. "The idea of *political* Pan-Islamism in the sense of unifying Muslims into one State, never existed: The ideal of Pan-Islamism is humanitarian, its meaning being that Islam is a factor for the combination of all races and nations and that it does not recognize the barriers of race, nationality or geographical frontiers. It must be distinctly understood that the interests of the Musalmans of India are centred on affairs relating to India, and not on those outside India, and that the Musalman is as much a part of the Indian nation as any other people living in this land of ours."[64]

Although the League was split in two in 1933, we find that in both sessions there is call for Hindu-Muslim unity: "India's political progress can only be achieved when the two great communities are like throbbing engines pulsating in rhythmic unity".—(Aziz group). "No fleet can move under full steam till all the vessels of the fleet are made equally powerful."—(Hidayat group).

The Presidential address of Sir Wazir Hasan at the 24th session in 1936 at Bombay is one of the most important of the Presidential addresses. In this address Sir Wazir Hasan explained that the failure of the National Convention held in Calcutta in 1928 to accept the amendments proposed by Mr. Jinnah as

spokesman of the Muslim League to the Nehru report was disastrous since the League at that time was willing to accept joint electorates subject to conditions. Sir Wazir Hasan fastened upon economic causes and proposed the following minimum programme for all national parties:

(a) a democratic government based on adult franchise;

(b) freedom of expression and repeal of repressive legislation ;

(c) immediate economic relief to the peasantry ; State provision for educated and uneducated unemployed; and an eight hour working day with fixed minimum wages for the workers ;

(d) introduction of free compulsory primary education.

Forty years later we have yet to achieve these minimum ideals of the League—the ideology of a poor man's welfare state.

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THE turning point was thus the year 1937. From that time onwards the concept of provincial autonomy of the Provinces began to lead to the demand for free democratic states and eventually to Pakistan. In 1938, at the Calcutta special session, Fazlul Haque articulated the economic factors. He pointed out that prior to the Resumption Regulation introduced by the British in 1819, 95% of landlords in Bengal were Muslims but the position was reversed by the Regulation, leaving only 5% of land in Muslim hands. In 1835, the Court language was suddenly changed from Persian to English in "flagrant violation of the East India Company's treaty with Emperor Shah Alam". He recounted the unspeakable tyrannies perpetuated on the Muslim aristocracy after 1857. In his Presidential Address

Mr. Jinnah pointed out that the Congress was making one of the "greatest blunders" by following its policy of "arrogance".[65]

At the regular session held in Patna in 1938, Mr. Jinnah again pointed out that there were four forces at play: the British, the Princes, the Hindus and the Muslims. He referred again to the Congress arrogance, the "intoxication of power", the imposition of Bande Mataram ("a hymn of hatred for the Muslims imposed upon Muslim children) and stated that the whole Hindi-Hindustani scheme was intended to stifle and suppress Urdu. As for ideology, the Quaid said that the Muslim League would be the ally of even the devil if need be in the interest of the League. He appealed to Muslims to unite under the League banner in this life and death struggle.[66]

The twenty-fifth session of the Muslim League held at Lucknow under the Presidentship of Mr. Jinnah was one of the most critical that ever took place in the existence of the League. It formally inaugurated Mr. Jinnah's last innings till his death eleven years later. A former disciple of the Indian nationalists Tilak and Gokhle, and a friend of Mrs. Sarojini Naidu who described him as an "Ambassador of Unity", Mr. Jinnah had spent the early 1930's in voluntary exile. While he was attempting to build up a Privy Council practice at his fashionable Hampstead house in London his heart was not at rest. This retirement, like that of De Gaulle to Bayeux, was not a swan song; it was the beginning of an epic. Old and young alike, from the Muslim national poet Allama Iqbal to young Muslim bureaucrats, middle-aged lawyers and landlords, and above all the students of Aligarh, Lahore, Peshawar, Karachi and Dacca gathered round the heroic leadership of this frail and aging Mr. Jinnah already turned sixty. He was as firm and unwavering as a lighthouse to the Muslim nation in danger of shipwreck.

It was on rocks of historical revenge and the turbulent foam of communal passions that the ship of Indian unity was to be wrecked. As India's constitutional advance was delayed, the passions smouldered which would burst into the unquenchable flames of ten years later.

The Government of India Act, 1935, had been passed in that year with Ramsay MacDonald as Premier. The Act provided for setting up responsible governments at the Federal and Provincial levels. However, in order to give effect to the Federal Provisions, the consent of the majority of the rulers of the Indian states was required. A view was held that these Federal Provisions could be invoked in respect of the provinces under direct British rule but at any rate this was never an option preferred by the Congress or the British Government.

Lord Linlithgow, the new Viceroy, sent with the mandate to introduce the Act acted in a circuitous manner. Although his son has tried to reconstruct an apologia for Lord Linlithgow in his book "Viceroy at Bay" the overwhelming historical evidence is that Linlithgow chose a policy of drift in the years between the passing of the Government of India Act and the outbreak of the war. It was Indian Independence, not the Viceroy, which was at bay. The political officers of that period knew the rulers and were familiar with their weaknesses, but the task of converting the rulers to the acceptance of the Federal Provisions was entrusted to others. A direct confrontation with the states was avoided, but indirect methods chosen by Linlithgow must have convinced the states that the Viceroy had little faith in responsible government at the Federal level.

After all, when Warren Hastings really wanted something badly enough, or Elphinstone, the Kohinoor diamond, the British had never failed to knock at the door stick in one hand and carrot in the other. Linlithgow is reported to have told Nehru that neither of them

would see Independence in their lifetime. A British scholar doing research on Sind told the writer recently that he has gone through the correspondence files of Linlithgow and the British governors and has seen a communication from Linlithgow in which he cautions against considering the possibility of Indian independence seriously. It was Linlithgow who, if blame is to be apportioned, held the possibility of an India both united and independent at bay at the only historical moment when it was possible, between the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the outbreak of the Second World War. During Linlithgow's Viceroyalty, constitutional advance was delayed till unity was no longer possible.

Basic material factors eroded unity. The population of India which was 125.0 million in 1800 had been growing at the rate of 1.1% between 1800 and 1850 and 0.4% between 1850-1900. The rate of growth had, however, doubled to 0.9% between 1900 and 1950. By 1960 the population had more than tripled since 1800 to 524.3 million.[67]

The crude death rate was rather stable until about 1920 at about 40 per thousand. The crude birth rate which was about 47 per thousand prior to 1920 had fallen to about 44 per thousand in the decade 1951-1961 while the crude death rate is estimated to have fallen by half to about 20 per thousand in 1961.[68]

Thus, the decline in mortality, which was the cause of the population explosion, started in about the 1920's, continuing to the 1950's as the mass killer diseases malaria, cholera, plague and tuberculosis were brought under control in succession. This population bulge, fuelled by the carburettor of expanding education, gave rise to an army of educated knocking at the doors of employment, which was not expanding so fast. By 1940, those born in 1920 were seeking jobs. As the irresistible force of the population bulge met the immovable object of economic depression and stagnation of the 1930's the scramble

for a place in the diminishing economic space further heightened communal tensions. It was in the towns, where the educated unemployed lived, and not the villages, that communal violence appeared early and at its worst. Worsening material condition thus provided the base for the superstructure of communal frenzy.

In 1937 the Provincial Legislatures were elected and the first Provincial Governments were formed. The League did not do much too well in these elections. At the twenty-fourth session held in 1936 the League had hardly articulated separatism with its talk of rhythmic unity. It was separatism which was to be its final *raison d'etre*. An organisation formed with communal harmony as one of its principal objects was driven by force of circumstances from the one-nation theory its leaders expounded upto 1936 to the two-nation theory in 1940. What led the League to shift its course? The answer is the experience of Ministry making and administration in the provinces where the Congress had the majority.

Political separatism had always been a strand in the League thinking. In 1930 Allama Iqbal had with prophetic vision predicted the formation of a separate Muslim north-western state, but the dominant themes until 1936 had been of a Federal but united India. It was the experience of the Congress ministries in the provinces which strengthened the separatist strand. The turning point for the League was between the 1936 and 1937 session. In the six provinces where the Congress had formed ministries they had, said Mr. Jinnah, the President of the Lucknow session, "by their words deeds and programme shown more and more that the Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fair play at their hands".[69]

Apprehension of a cultural chauvinism, the rewriting of Indian history, the rejection of the glorious Muslim civilization of India began to turn into fear. A new voice is heard from the erstwhile Ambassador

of Unity at the League session in Lucknow in 1937 articulating this dread of cultural annihilation: "Hindi is to be the national language of all India and the Bande Mataram is to be the national song and is to be forced upon us. On the very threshold of ....power......the majority community have shown their hand: that Hindustan is for the Hindus. Only the Congress masquerades under the name of nationalism, whereas the Hindu Mahasabha does not mince words". While the League passed a resolution defining its object to be "the establishment in India of full independence" this was to be "in the form of a federation of *free* (italics added) democratic states"[70]—the concept in embryo of the Lahore resolution. The session also recorded its disapproval of the Federation Scheme as embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935.

The experience of the Congress governments and indeed the manner of their formation foretold the shape of things to come, the tyranny of the majority—with a historical complex. From the beginning Congress insisted that one, and not two, Muslim League members was to be included in the U.P. Provincial Cabinet and he should sever his relations with the League as a precondition. Denial of political representation breeds separatism. Failure to protect the Muslims also increased fears. Between 1937 and 1939, 85 serious riots with 2000 casualties and 170 fatalities took place in British India.[71]

The problem of Pakistan was a problem in the minds of the Hindu majority. Nehru preached secularism but he was hardly representative of a caste-ridden revivalist Hindu sentiment. There was a conflict between the professed Congress creed of nationalism and its actual practice of Hindu raj. The imposition of an artificial language Hindi itself signified that the Congress was not reconciled to the conquest of India by the Muslims. The golden thread of Persian and Arabic that ran through the fabric of Urdu had to

be removed and the synthetic fibre of a resurrected Sanskrit rewoven.

As a majority the Hindus had the right to be tolerant of the Muslim minority and not launch a cultural and physical aggression upon them, that is to say, it was their duty to do so. The cost of failure was the unity of India. The responsibility for partition must therefore lie upon the Hindu majority. It was for them to concede to the Muslim demands and provide all the safeguards required. Most of the leaders of the Congress acted like lower court lawyers—which is exactly what Patel was—unmindful of the fact that a federation, irrespective of the safeguards, with one police and army, and interstate commerce, has a tendency to centralisation. The Quaid did realise this, and he therefore now opted for territorial separatism.

Pakistan was a problem in the minds of the Hindu majority—whether to reconcile with history of Muslim conquest or reject it. After all, the Muslim rule in India is a long period of Indian history. It cannot be wished away as an aggression or imperialism. In deflecting history, in doing violence to the glorious culture, the Mohammedan-Anglo-Oriental culture, which was the name of the Aligarh movement the Congress governments themselves created the demand for Pakistan.

The Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940, brings us to the end of this survey, because this resolution brings into focus the concept of territorial separatism. The idea of territorial consolidation starts from an open letter written by Abdul Qadir Bilgrami to Gandhi in 1920 published in Zulqarnain, was echoed by Lala Lajpat Rai in 1924 who also advocated partition, for different reasons, was given its philosophical foundation by Allama Iqbal in his address in 1930 ; was given a name by Rehmat Ali in 1933; reappeared on the Muslim League platform in 1938 when a resolution for a separate Muslim Federation was

moved at the Sind Muslim League Conference that year.

At the League session held on March 22-24, 1940, in Lahore and attended by about 100,000 members, Resolution No. 1 moved by A. K. Fazlul Haque and seconded by Choudhry Khaliquzzaman stated that no constitutional plan would be acceptable to Muslims unless "geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority . . . . . should be grouped to constitute Independent States . . . . . ." It was at this time that the Muslims became a nation and Mr. Jinnah its Quaid.

This is a brief review of the concept of Pakistan as it evolved in the years 1906 to 1940. It is an attempt to answer the bewildering questions asked by today's youth. As one who was born in the year that the Muslim League passed the resolution for a separate Muslim Federation in Karachi, one has the privilege of having grown, as it were, with Pakistan. But to those of our youth who have not heard the sound of Hindu *pani* and Muslim *pani* at the Howrah station, who have seen the pretty faces on Amritsar Television and the lilting song but not witnessed the absurdity of animal worship to the point of degradation, it is difficult to realise at what great cost and sacrifice a precious and tolerant culture born of Muslim civilization in India was saved.

When people ask what is the meaning of Pakistan, no single answer can be given. Indeed it is difficult to ask such questions about states. What is the meaning of Britain, Rome, France or Italy? Can we say that the meaning of Italy is "Father, Son, the Holy Ghost" because it is a Christian country and Rome the centre of Christianity? Equally in error are those who seek to deny the role of Islam in India. Islam in India, more than anywhere else, came as a

liberating force. Its message of equality was the first direct attack on the bedrock of inequality—the cardinal principle of the Hindu social system. Where Buddhism had floundered, Islam succeeded in saving a large part of the people of India from misery.

Thus, when we survey the constituents which led to Pakistan we find that it was not a single-faceted or abstract religious principle alone. First of all as to the meaning of Pakistan it was a territory. Pakistan itself is an abbreviation, and if someone had asked Rehmat Ali what is the meaning of Pakistan he would have said: a state comprising Punjab, Afghan Suba, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. Secondly, this territory was the homeland for Muslims of India. Previous to August 14, 1947, every Muslim—whether living in Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, Kashmir or Frontier or in Haryana, UP, CP, Madras, East Punjab and Bombay—was an Indian Muslim because under the British, India was one. Thus, the population of Pakistan consists of Muslims of British India. Thirdly, Pakistan has a government—the Federal Government as well as Provincial Governments. It has an army. It has one economy, based, unlike India, on one river system. Thus, Pakistan fulfils all the requirements of a modern national state. It has one national language whose preservation was also a motive factor in the demand for Pakistan. Modernization is another dominant motif. The Muslim League sought a state which would have the benefit of the industrial revolution of the West, the political institutions of the West, Western science and learning. Muhammedan-Anglo-Oriental was the Indian Muslim culture, the source of Pakistan.

Pakistan today stands at the physical and metaphysical crossroads between Europe and Asia. Alexander has trodden past the pathways of Pakistan and his tutor Aristotle is regarded as Hakeem-e-Awwal in the madrassahs. The synthesis between Greece—the fountain of western civilization; the land of Kaniska;

the influences of Islam ; and once again the return of Western ideas during the British Raj—has all the makings of an Indian Arabesque decorated with the golden boughs of East and West.

Of all qualities, Plato regarded wisdom to be the greatest. Neither through population nor through resources can we dominate the world. But the power of ideas is greatest of all. In this respect we have to realise that the world is moving toward one civilization dominated by what we call Western civilization. Indeed this was the message of Sir Syed. It is possible to reject this but it will be an expensive and unnecessary mistake. It is wiser to accept and acknowledge the best of Western civilization but to recall that it is not alien to us. Much of what is Western civilization today is the World of Islam's gift to man. If we look at it this way we will have little difficulty in dealing with modern question because we are only receiving back our own contribution to world progress. Up to Christianity, religions had emphasized personal salvation. Islam emphasized not only personal salvation but also a social revolution.

We live in an age of science. Each day science presents man with new discoveries with future shock. Can the ever-changing world of science be reconciled with the immutable principles of Islam? This is the Muslim dilemma of 1977, which we shall discuss in the next chapter on Islam and Science.

CHAPTER II

ISLAM AND SCIENCE

BEFORE the advent of Islam, natural objects and nature itself, the sun, the moon and animals were objects of worship. The worship of natural objects is itself an irrational act. Reason regards natural objects as proper subjects for scrutiny and observation and the discovery of laws which govern nature. By breaking the idols, the Revolution of Islam substituted rationalism for the ignorance, superstition and myth of the age of Jahiliyya.

The Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him) is reported to have said, "He who leaves his home in search of knowledge walks in the path of God." Thirst for knowledge and unravelling of the mysteries of nature are the essential components of the religion of Islam. The Holy Quran says, "Verily, in the creation of the heavens and earth, and the alteruation of night and day there are signs for men of understanding."

According to another tradition of the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him), "seeking of knowledge is imperative for all Muslims, male or female"—(Talabul Ilme Ferizatun Ala Kulle Muslimin Wa Muslimatin).

Yet another tradition of the Holy Prophet says : "God has not created anything better than reason." Thus the use of rational faculties is an essential embodied in the Holy Quran and Sunna. It is therefore axiomatic that science, the offspring of reason, is not opposed to Islam.

"From the fourth century of the Christian era to the 12th", writes Ameer Ali, "the gloom that overshadowed Europe grew deeper and deeper. During

these ages of ferocious bigotry, ecclesiasticism barred every access through which the light of knowledge, humanity or civilization could enter. This continued until the end of the Medieval age. In 1453, Constantine and his orthodox followers branded learning as magic and punished it as treason." Thus Islam may have done a service to the world of Christianity in the conquest of Constantinople in as much as it also signified the destruction of orthodoxy and bigotry in the West. It was a war that was won but a peace that was lost.

During Europe's dark age, while Vanari was burnt alive, Bruno put to death and Galileo imprisoned for seeking knowledge, the world of Islam created an upheaval in Science and Technology. Western scholars are reluctant to acknowledge the depth that modern Western civilization owes to the world of Islam. This is not surprising.

It is surprising though that we in the world of Islam are reluctant to press the claim. This is because Muslim society is divided into two. It seems as if a part of Muslim society wants to suppress the contribution of Muslim civilisation to rationalism, enlightenment and science. As early as 1890, Ameer Ali, in his book 'Spirit of Islam' wrote : "For five centuries Islam assisted in the free intellectual development of humanity but reactionary movements then set in. The cultivators of Science and Philosophy were pronounced to be beyond the pale of Islam."

Later, Molvi Abdul Karim, in his book 'The Prophet of Islam and his Teachings', published in 1936 wrote: "I believe true Islam will again assert itself. Signs of Islamic renaissance are already visible all over the world."

This was contemporaneous with the lectures on reconstruction of Muslim thought of Allama Iqbal. Indeed ever since Shah Wali Ullah the two concepts of reaction and renaissance have been a constant contradiction in Muslim society. Sir Syed's Aligarh

embodies the concept of renaissance, and Pakistan is its finest flower.

The cultivators of science and philosophy are not beyond the pale of Islam. In this connection a particular responsibility lies upon the intellectuals of Pakistan—and a great opportunity. Pakistan today is situated at the centre of the world both physical and metaphysical. In the physical sense, it lies in the cockpit of Asia with three of the world's most populous countries as its neighbours and the 21st Century is preordained to be an Asian Century.

Metaphysically, Pakistan stands at the crossroads of human thought. It is the seat of the most ancient urban civilisation—the Indus Valley Civilization. Though a part of the Muslim world, its history includes contacts with all the important religions including Buddhism and Christianity.

Finally, in as much as the routes of modern civilisation lie in the Hellenic spirit, which itself is incorporated in the classical heritage of Islam, Pakistan has had four great moments of contact with the classics. The first moment was when Aristotle's own pupil traversed down the valley of Swat to the Indus. The second moment was at the time of the Arab conquest of Sind. The third moment was in the Khanqahs established by the Ghaznavid Court in Lahore. Both the Arabs and the Ghaznavids brought the teachings of Aristotle as part of their bag and baggage. The fourth, the British Raj, did not introduce anything new in terms of the classical heritage, for already Aristotle was regarded as Hakeem-a-Awwal in the courses of Islamic schools and universities.

The emphasis is laid on *Hellenism* because, to revert to our first premise, the revolution of Islam brought about a fundamental change in man's attitude to nature, looking upon it not as possessing supernatural powers but as a proper object of scientific scrutiny and not of worship. Nature can only become subservient to man upon man's discovering

the laws that govern nature and thus equipping himself to reform and control nature for the benefit of mankind.

It was Aristotle and other Greek philosophers who first attempted to define the laws and rules of thought. The treasure house of their knowledge provided the tools which the attitude of Islam to nature could use. The thought of ancient Greece as a Hellenistic device for Islamic attitudes is the synthesis between Islam and the classical heritage of antiquity.

In the field of science this point of synthesis is observation and experiment, which are the two sources of scientific discovery. While the philosophers of ancient Greece had, with the exception of Archimedes, emphasised the speculative method, the philosophers and scientists belonging to the world of Islam took a step further and resorted to the experimental methods and inductive reasoning. Thus the difference was that while Greek classical thought was largely deductive, the philosopher-scientists of Islam, like Ibn Hazam and Ibn Taymiyya, criticised the Greek method and emphasised the empirical method, i.e., a science based on facts collected, phenomenon observed, and experiments conducted. In his "Scope of Logic", Ibn Hazam laid emphasis on perception as a primary source of knowledge. In this respect the Muslim philosophers represented the modern approach to the philosophy of science.

The shortcoming of the syllogistic method followed in the Dialogues of Plato is that though it apparently demonstrates conclusions, the syllogism is in reality a tautology, because the conclusions are implicit in the definition itself. It teaches nothing new about the world which is not already contained in the first premise. Modern philosophy of Science emphasises the verification principle as the foundation of knowledge, as opposed to the syllogistic method. It is only when Science poses a hypothesis, which can be proved to be true or false after being tested by experiment, that

the result is invention or discovery. This is called the verification principle, the foundation of logical positivism, the modern philosophy of science.

Thus scientific thinking involves generalisations in the form of hypothesis about the laws of nature, which hypothesis is subject to verification. Its two essentials are observation and experiment—only that phenomenon which is observed and proved by experiment belongs to the realm of science. The philosophical attitude of Ibn Hazam and Ibn-e-Taymiyya is thus centuries in advance of the empiricist philosophers, Berkely, Hume, Locke, Descartes, leading indeed to the logical positivism of the Vienna circle which emphasises perception as the primary source of knowledge, just as Ibn-i-Hazam did.

So much for observation, which is the first essential of Science. As for the experimental method on his "Refutation of Logic", Ibn-i-Taymiyya characterises this method as the only certain method of knowledge. Roger Bacon who introduced the experimental method in the West was taught by those who had studied in the universities of Muslim Spain. Thus both the scientific spirit and the experimental method are Islam's legacy to modern civilization. In his book, "The Making of Humanity", Biffault admits that "Science is the most momentous contribution of Arab Civilization to the modern world".

In Islamic history the greatest impetus to knowledge and science came during the Abbaside period. Khalifa Mamoon (813—833 AD) continued the emphasis on translation of the classics which had been established by the first Abbaside Khalifa, Mansoor, by creating an institution for translation of classical antiquity called Darul Hikma (House of Wisdom).

In Spain, Muslims laid a modern system of canals, developed textile industries, and produced the world's first sociologist—Ibn Khaldun. The light of knowledge was lit by the Fatimid Al Muiz in Cairo. Ibn-i-

Sina distinguished between essence and existence. The quintessence was in the institutions established in Baghdad by Khwaja Hassan Nizamul Mulk Toosi, the Wazir of the Seljuk Ruler. It was through these sources that Europe came to know of Greek thought, for Pope Gregory had forbidden the study of ancient Greek and Roman writers. Thus it was the world of Islam whch taught Europe how to think.

In an age when the Muslim world imports chemicals from other countries, it deserves to be remembered that chemistry is another legacy of Islam. Jabir Ibn-i-Hazam (8th century A.D.) is regarded as the Father of Modern Chemistry. He explained the two principal chemical processes of calcination and reduction. It is said that he knew how to make crude sulphuric acid—an indicator of a country's level of progress in the modern world. Unfortunately the Muslim chemist got caught in the cobwebs of alchemy, in the discovery of the elixir which would turn ordinary matter into gold, although there were those like Al-Kindi (9th century A.D.) who clearly understood that gold and silver could be obtained by mining, and not through any other process.

The Muslims were the first to produce glass and sugar. In Kitab Al Asrar and other works, Razi (9th century) made important contributions to classification experiment and apparatus. Before the Muslim chemists of the 12th and 13th centuries ran into the cul-de-sac of irrational alchemy Muslim chemists made a glorious contribution to this science.

In the science of Biology one Abu Ubaida (8th century) wrote more than a hundred books on horses. In Kitabul Tanbeeh, Al Masudi presented a theory of evolution. Botanists like Al Baytar travelled throughout the world in search of plants and medicinal herbs. In the 14th century, Al Daniri produced an encyclopaedia of animal life.

In the field of social sciences Ibn Khaldun's "Muqaddama" contains not only historiography and

sociology, but also presents Khaldun as an environmentalist. In one of the passages he described how the congestion of large cities leads to fumes and vapours which pollute the air and affect the health of the people.

It were Muslim scientists who invented the telescope (Abdul Hassan); the pendulum (Ibn Younus) ; the first watch (Kutbi); the mariner's compass and hence the mastery of the seas; the astrolabe observatory and hence the mastery of the skies ; soap; the wind mill; the concept of zero; the size of the earth; the eclipses and equinoxes; plain and spherical trignometry; analytical geometry (Nasiruddin Toosi) ; Algebra (Aljabbar and Khwarizimi),; the first modern hospital and encyclopaedia of medicine (Al-Razi); the classification of drugs and medicines (Ibn Sina's "Al Qanoon Fil Tib" systemised 760 drugs); surgery ; optics (Al Hassan's "Optica Thesaurus influenced Roger Bacon, Da Vinci and Kepler); the rotation and sphericity of the earth (it was an Arab pilot who guided Vasco de Gama). Muslim philosophers developed the new Science of Reason which can be compared to modern linguistic analysis. The Ikhwanus Safa gave a general resume of knowledge.

Islam gave to the world the idea of the University. The Muslim University of Al-Azhar is the oldest in the world. Unfortunately the principal centre of science and learning, which was Baghdad, was destroyed by Halaku Khan in 1258 AD, sweeping aside from the face of the earth the world's first University of Nishapur, founded in 1066. The Nizamia University of Baghdad and the Mustan Sarih were founded two centuries later. In his book, "The Moors in Spain", Lanepool writes: "For nearly eight centuries under the Mohammedan rulers, Spain set to all Euope a shining example of a civilized and enlightened state. Arts, science and literature prospered as nowhere else in Europe."

This brief survey raises fundamental questions as to the present state of Muslim civilization. While we extol the past we must criticise the present. We must look for the reasons why the same world of Islam which gifted Science and Technology to the West needs to import almost everything which is representative of modern science and technology—from Mirages to IBMs.

I pose the hypothesis that the present state of technological backwardness is due to the desertion of the scientific spirit of observation and experiment which is part of the legacy of Islam. Where are the Ibn Khalduns, Al Jabbars, Ibn Taymiyyas of today?

Is it not the case that since the sack of Baghdad the world of Islam has witnessed a diminishing interest in observation and experiment and an increase in repetition and limitation of the past and expression of opinion without facts. And if all this is true, we must seek again the reconstruction of thought to which Allama Iqbal refers in his famous lectures on this subject.

If we yearn for a future as glorious as our past, observation and experiment will be constantly required because the cosmos is itself in a flux and life is full of contradiction. And change is the law of nature.

We cannot advance in the world without the use of reason, which requires, in turn, the science of reason, of Ilmul Kalam. Ilmul Kalam alone povides the basis for the reconstruction of Thought. As Ibne Sina wrote in Alshifa, "So much can be said briefly and concisely about logic. It is like a sword which can be used either for a holy war or for highway robbery."

A proper development of science requires a combination of theory and empiricism. Kemal Faruki says that the reason why only 100 patents are registered in Pakistan each year, while the figure is 150,000 in the USA ; 130,000 in the Soviet Union;

and 80,000 in Japan, is that we have lost the scientific spirit of innovation.

Early Muslim thinkers found the answer to the problem of theory and empiricism in deductive and inductive knowledge, as can be seen from the following excerpt which appears in Rosenthal's "The Classical Heritage in Islam": "It also belongs, of necessity, to all the conclusions that follow from the argument of the theorists (the Dogmatists), that research as to the way in which medicine was discovered is vain and superfluous. You theorists believe, in fact, that such historical investigation is useful because one needs it for the discovery of that which had not yet been discovered in the past; thus you can undertake it after all and in this way discover what you want to discover. But if everything has already been discovered by means of theory, we need not discover anything further in the future. Accordingly, research as to how remedies applied for healing in medicine were discovered is also worthless and vain. Besides that (in the first place) you admit and agree with us that very many things, apart from those already discovered, have not yet been discovered, and (secondly), that in what exists we must pass from the one to another similar one demonstrates clearly even to unintelligent people, and all the more to others, that medicine has not been discovered by theory. I do not know how it has happened to us that these statements made in passing have made it immediately clear that nothing at all has been discovered by analogical reasoning from the known to the unknown, though we had not intended that at all, but had rather intended to explain that not everything has been discovered by analogical reasoning."

In this context it is possible to delineate as meaningless one of the common but futile debates as if society has to choose either a material or a spiritual approach, and from this to derive a necessary con-

tradiction between Islam and progress. Islam testifies that these contradictions are not necessary in Muslim civilization.

The emphasis on the concept of renaissance signifies the re-discovery of the extent and character of the impact of Greek classical antiquity and how it was adopted and subjected to independent elaboration by Muslim philosophers in the field of scientific methods in philosophy, physics, geometry and astronomy. The recognition of this synthesis would form the basis of renaissance.

Here one may refer to one of the points raised by theologians whether Islam is a complete answer to every problem. If this means that the principles of Islam present a complete answer, the argument can be sustained. But if they mean that we should close our eyes, that nothing new is to be discovered, that no advance is possible in the physical or social sciences, then this attitude is incorrect and indeed un-Islamic, for Islam itself teaches the Muslims to observe and learn.

* * *

ONE of the important questions which ought to be a subject of research by scientists and scholars is the question: how did it come to happen that while Islam itself contributed to the European renaissance, the Islamic renaissance was arrested? A point for historians to ponder is that while the year 1453, when Constantinople fell, marks a great defeat for the West and a great victory for Islam, it also marks the end of the medieval age in the West. Perhaps the reason lies, apart of course from the Mongol invasions, in the fact that the absence of the scientific spirit in the medieval age was the cause of the defeat of the West, and the presence of the scientific spirit in Islam of that time was the cause of its success; and

the defeat itself by breaking the old society of the Western world permitted the growth of new ideas and new structures culminating through the process of reformation, industrial revolution, capitalism and imperialism. Will history record that the setbacks in some of the wars of the 1960's and 1970's which Islam has had to face gave the final impetus to a quest for renaissance and eventual liberation of Jerusalem?

The two essentials of European renaissance—the recovery of Greek classics and the diminution of ecclesiastical authority during the Reformation created the nation state and modern Western civilization.

According to a tradition of the Holy Prophet quoted in *The Spirit of Islam*, "Knowledge enables its possessor to distinguish what is forbidden from what is not: it lights the way to heaven; it is our friend in the desert, our society in solitude, our companion when bereft of friends; it guides us to happiness; it sustains us in misery; it is our ornament in the company of friends; it serves as our armour against our enemies."

Today the world of Islam is in quest of science and reason. Allama Iqbal called for reconstruction of Muslim thought, Ataturk stood for modernisation of Turkey. Earlier still, Sir Syed and his Aligarh movement embodied a successful blending of Muslim culture and modern Science and Technology. On the other hand, obscurantism and confusion try to bewilder the Muslim youth who are presented with a choice in terms of "either-or" between Religion and Science.

The fact that the choice is not necessary is proved by our own history. Only the enemies of the Muslims would sponsor the rejection of Science, which is Islam's gift to the world. That synthesis between Islamic culture and Science is possible has been established by history. The golden age of Islam's contribution to Science starts with the Caliph Mansoor,

and at the time of Al-Mamoon it was the vanguard of civilizations, combining the priceless treasure of Greece and Rome on one side and of Persia, Arabia, the Indian subcontinent and China on the other.

Baghdad of the 9-12th century stood at the centre of world culture and Science and disproved Kipling's maxim that East and West cannot meet. Now that once again world civilization is in the making, through television and other means of communication it is important that we struggle to ensure that we have a place under the sun and are not plunged into the dark ages.

We witness today one of biggest battles of the mind for Muslim youth. Unfortunately, intellectuals and philosophers, in the words of Allama Iqbal, are paralysed. There are those who are better equipped to take up Allama Iqbal's quest and break the deafening silence of these centuries, and continue the quest till there is no turning away.

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INDIA has been conquered many a time. But the most insidious of all conquests was the Aryan conquest whose Swastika is the symbol of the Hindu Mahasabha. The Aryan conquest was the most insidious because it elevated imperialism to the level of a religion. Racial inferiority became a religious principle for the conquered. It was thus not only a conquest of territory but a conquest of the mind. The dark people, the original inhabitants of India, became the lower castes and the fair-skinned conquerors the higher caste. This subjugation has now lasted for three thousand years.

Buddhism in India, Islam in India, and indeed Westernisation of India, all were liberating influences; because they professed that all men are born equal—the very antithesis of Hinduism. It is a remarkable trail of psychological warfare of Hinduism that many

progressive Muslims are apologetic about the role of Islam and of Muslim rulers in India. They are apologetic about Aurangzeb. Perhaps if Aurangzeb had come at the time of Akbar and Akbar at the time of Aurangzeb the history of India would have been different. Yet had Aurangzeb succeeded in stamping out Hinduism from India, this is the greatest contribution he could have made to the liberation of the Indian people. Eradication of Hinduism, the most ancient Imperialism in India, was thus a precondition for Indian unity.

Another conquest of India is inevitable to wipe out the traces of that primordial aggression which has imposed a social apartheid upon India since the Codes of Manu. This conquest has to be a conquest of the minds, since the only lasting conquests are the conquests of the mind. Buddhism conquered Asoka's mind and vanquished the victor. Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti spread the message of Islam through love and not hate. In the battlefields of the mind, conquest is only possible through a superior civilization. Let us resolve to build that civilization.

This resolve is painstaking and Herculian. It does not admit of utopianism. Pakistan is not a castle built on shifting sands. Nor can it be a castle built in the abstract air. The national identity of any country lies in the land and the history of the people who inhabit it. A search in any other direction is a philosophical error bound to lead to sorrows.

CHAPTER III

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE UTOPIANS

THESE are desperate times; these are also times of hope. As the dramatic 1970's come to a close, an apparition of doom rises above the Earth. Inflation, unemployment, the population bomb, nuclear weapons —the four horsemen of the modern apocalypse—gallop menacingly down the pathways of history towards the likelihood of a precipitous global collapse. The twentieth century man has made doomsday possible. He has the capacity to put an early end to his finite species. The smiling skies reveal nuclear teeth; atomic sharks swim in the life-giving seas; evil silos embedded in the good earth bear weapons of destruction which can destroy life itself. We live in a dangerous world. Yet we also live in a world of hope. The oppressed people of the Third World—the world proletariat—have scored bigger and bigger successes in resisting exploitation and imperialism. An unjust world economic order is on the verge of collapse. Asia is at the centre of these powerful contradictions. Pakistan is situated in the cockpit of Asia. It is, therefore, necessary for all of us to reflect on how Pakistan is situated in the world we live in today.

As we reflect on the deserts of time that is past to the vast ocean of time that lies yonder we need to ask: Whither Pakistan? Is Pakistan destined once again to be the cradle of another mighty civilization? Will its granaries be full; its children educated and well fed; its fields manicured to precision; its cities clean; its people happy and contented? Will it be able to overthrow hatred from the minds of men and all

things that breed hatred, greed, provincialism, tribalism? Will the peasants and workers of the Indus and its tributaries rise again and tie with their hands a golden thread of comfort, security and justice around our beautiful land?

For centuries the waters of the river Indus which nourish our land have borne witness to the python-like embrace of an iniquitous social system. For centuries these waters have yearned for the voice of reason, justice, and humanity ; for a new civilization in the valley of the Indus. Pakistan, the New Pakistan of our dreams, is nothing else but a new Indus Valley Civilization—with new politics, new economics, and a new society, a Pakistani society ; not a soulless, arid, dogmatic society; but a society with a human face that our people can understand and sing about as they sing Heer or the songs of Khushal Khan Khattak or Shah Abdul Latif.

The time has come to reflect and resolve on the fundamental issues confronting us as a nation. There are many citizens who can write and reflect on basic issues. This effort is necessary on the part of all thinking Pakistanis because a battle is now being waged for the minds of men and women—particularly young Pakistan. In this battlefield of the minds, many forces are at work. Discord, hatred, provincialism are raising their ugly heads. The confrontations of the diplomatic arena or of the battlefield are not decisive—but this battle for the minds of young Pakistan is the most serious and decisive of all. Time alone will dictate whether the destiny of Pakistan will pass to the youth of today and their children. And if the battle is to be won, it is essential that to the new generations of Pakistanis the concept of Pakistan should be as vivid as a rainbow ; the task of national consolidation should be uppermost in their minds ; and the construction of a glorious, new, scientific and humanist Indus Civilization should be their ultimate tryst with history.

A country can change everything except its geography; that is, its neighbours. Pakistan's geographical setting has its advantages and disadvantages. It is one of the largest countries bordering the Middle East. Islam is the faith of the vast majority of its people. With India to the south and south-east, China to the north-east, Afghanistan and nearby Soviet Union to the north, and the Arabian sea to the west, Pakistan's location is of the utmost strategic importance. Our country has little rainfall but thanks to irrigation it has a fertile land which provides us with food and clothing. At the same time there are large areas of desert and arid zones. The roof of the world is to the north-east and smaller mountain ranges run across the centre of the country. Indus and its tributaries provide us with water for irrigation. Fishing is an ancient occupation along our coastline as also the tradition of communication with peoples beyond the seas. Pakistan is situated in the valley of the river Indus, the seat of a mighty civilization in ancient times and of a turbulent history since.

While the early stirrings and the origins of the Indus Valley civilization are lost in the distant mists of pre-history, historians agree that between the years 2500 and 1500 B. C. there flourished in the Indus plain one of the most developed civilizations of the ancient world. Harappa, the most outstanding symbol of this civilization, is a model of regulated life, with its wide straight roads dividing and subdividing the city in square blocks, well-planned houses, water supply, and underground drainage. Harappa had no slums. The civilization stretched out from north of Gwadar bay in western Baluchistan to Alamgirpur near Delhi in the east and the delta of the Indus in the south to the foothills of the Himalayas in the north — encompassing not only much of Pakistan today but areas beyond our borders. There is evidence that people of the valley traded with its

neighbours in the Persian Gulf from 800 miles of coastline.

Little is known about the social system or the religion of these ancient people, or whether they had a religion at all. Is the bearded priest a philosopher-king, landlord or mandarin? What mysteries lie behind the silhouette of the dancer caught in a moment of eternity? Was it a wind of social change, a holocaust, a flood or invasion which wrecked this civilization? Was its society communist, feudal, tribal?

In the stillness of a winter morning as one walks softly on the paved streets of Moenjodaro one can hear the chariot of history moving inevitably, pushing Pakistan and its people forward. The serenity and quietude of Moenjodaro is interrupted by the aeroplanes landing at the nearby airport. Little else has changed. The clay models of the bullock carts in the museum seem like miniatures of those on the road. The wooden wheels with a central plank have the same design.

The circumstances under which this mighty and ancient civilization crumbled are not known, save that it was on the ruins of the Indus Valley civilization that the Aryan invaders established their new order, Hindu-Brahmanism. After the conquest, the Aryans established the caste system. In order to ensure their permanent superiority they elevated caste to the level of a religion, in which the Aryans were invested with divine attributes and the conquered people relegated to the level of devils. Both the low-caste Hindus and non-Hindus were excluded from domestic, civil and military honours in this life and denied salvation in the life hereafter. The caste system thus institutionalized the aggression by giving an immutable religious sanction to the Aryan conquest—glorifying the conquerors and degrading the conquered in a permanent social affront.

The Scythian rulers, who succeeded the Aryans, did not intrude into the domain of religion and were

content with the nominal subjugation of the local population until Buddha, a Scythian prince, arose and preached that "All men are equal, and salvation is equally open to all". In the encounter between Brahmanism and Buddhism, the latter which preached the equality of man represented the progressive force. A splendid civilization arose during the Buddhist period reaching its zenith during the reign of Asoka, but eventually Buddhism paid the price by banishment from India. After this reversal, no successful challenge was presented to the Brahmanic concept of intrinsic inequality and a divided society until the advent of Islam. Domination is the essence of Hindu-Brahmanism. Internally, it manifests itself in the caste system. Its external manifestation is domination over neighbours. Hegemonism, the modern expression of this domination, has its roots in the Hindu consciousness of the Chatrapati, or Lord Paramount, who held sway over the vassal states from the Himalayas to Cape Camorin and from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal.

Whether by treaty annexation or accession, the long shadow of paramountcy extends over Kashmir, Bangladesh, Sikkim. The concept of Pakistan opposes this spirit of inequality manifested in domination. The idea of inequality is in itself an aggressive idea; it was a dagger thrust into the heart of the Indus Valley civilization. The plazas, baths and courtyards of Moenjodaro—the pre-Hindu civilization—bear no such mark of division. Like Islam, Buddhism too supported the idea of man's equality—but it was an equality of suffering, a sharing of abstinence, a balance of sorrow. Islam's idea was all the more revolutionary, for it represented the equality of material wealth and of justice in this world. Pakistan is, thus, a revolution cut out from the heart of history.

Pakistan is the product of historical forces. Social classes are neither intrinsically revolutionary nor intrinsically reactionary. Each social class has to be

judged at its point in time. Even the bourgeoisie are a revolutionary class at a certain point in social development. Thus the feudalist, legalist school during the Chin dynasty 2000 years ago in China was a revolutionary class compared to the philosophers of the slave-owning system. A proper understanding of the role of Islam expresses its revolutionary, historical character. Fundamentally, the class system is more progressive than caste system. The latter is a doctrine of permanent inequality, while classes and class contradictions are the moving force of history.

Thus, a proper study of Islam must be made in the context of history. Islam has played two significant revolutionary roles in history. Islam in Arabia was a force for unity of the Arab tribes, symbolised by the idea of one God as opposed to polytheism—with each tribe having its own god. Provincialism, sectarianism, linguistic chauvinism are like the tribal gods of the period of Jahiliyya—idols we have to break to save Pakistan. Islam was also a social revolution—liberating the women, helping the slaves, preaching the equality of man. In the context of the sub-continent, Islam presented a fundamental contradiction to the social stratification of the caste system. The Islamic doctrine of the equality of man is incompatible with the doctrine of permanent inequality, which is the basis of Hindu-Brahmanism.

After Buddhism had lost in its encounter with Hinduism, the liberating message of Islam posed a new challenge to inequality in the sub-continent—a challenge which has stood the test of time. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) emancipated us from the slavery of superstition, broke the fetters of caste, liberated us from the prejudices of race and tribe, and enlarged our horizons. His message is a message of peace and hope for humanity, of tolerance and love, and of justice and equality between man and man. The impact of Islam on the sub-continent establishes that this is a

message that changed the course of history and is ever capable of transforming the destiny of man.

"The main social result of the introduction of Islam as a religion into India", says a modern Hindu historian, "was the division of society on a vertical basis. Before the tenth century, Hindu society was divided horizontally. Islam, on the other hand, split society into two sections from top to bottom and what has now come to be known, in the phraseology of today, as two separate nations came into being from the beginning." The caste system is a prison, while the class system is a system of rewards. Caste separations are the citadel of reaction while class contradictions are a revolutionary force which move history. It was the force of Islam which broke the prison walls of permanent inequalities between man and man implicit in the caste system. The revolution of Islam thus paved the way for the future classless society.

Seen in these terms, the collision of Hinduism and Islam in India is a contradiction between a revolutionary force of the Islamic idea of eternal brotherhood and equality of man and the reactionary concept of the doctrine of permanent inequality of man implicit in the Hindu-Brahmanic idea of caste, which binds even succeeding generations in permanent enslavement.

Islam was spread by the unarmed mystics and sufis and not through the sword, as evidenced by the fact that the percentage of Muslims around many of the principal seats of Muslim political power is low.

Indeed, one explanation for the comparative ease of the Arab conquest of Sind in the first decade of the eighth century was the liberating force of Islam and the policy of conciliation rather than force. Indeed it is recorded that at places the large numbers of Buddhists living in Sind and Multan had welcomed the Arabs for ridding them of the iniquitous Hindu rulers. Thus, from its very inception, Muslim civiliza-

tion in India came as a liberating mission. It represented not only a religious but a cultural revolution. Theocratic absolutism and conversion by force were eschewed by the Arab conquerors. A distinctive feature of Arab rule in Sind was its respect for local practice and equal treatment of the people in matters of state. Idol-worshippers were not punished, and Mohammad bin Qasim accorded to the people of Sind and Multan the same status as enjoyed by people of the Book in other conquered lands. This approach was followed by subsequent Muslim rulers.

Cultural influences of the Arab conquest are reflected in the script, but time's obliteration has wiped out the visible effects of Arab rule. Indeed, as regards culture, the region now comprising Pakistan belongs to the 11th century Ghaznavid period. During this period, Lahore became a centre of learning as well as a centre of government, and to this day Lahore retains this aura. Both the court language as well as the system of laws reflected the Central Asian tradition, which was strengthened by intellectuals and divines from Central Asia fleeing from the Mongol invaders.

The tone and tenor of Muslim rule in the sub-continent was set during the three-hundred-year history of the Delhi Sultanate which followed the Ghaznavid period. A sophisticated administrative structure developed during the Sultanate, backed by a powerful fighting force in the shape of a standing army. The Sultanate established once for all the principle that the Islamic state in India was not a theocracy. Though some of the Delhi rulers received formal titles from the Caliph, this legal fiction did little to affect the reality that after the sack of Baghdad the temporal authority of the Caliph had withered away and a quiet reformation had taken place.

Iltutmish was the first to recognize that a theocratic state was unworkable. Neither Balban's courtesy towards the *ulema* nor his piety permitted religious

divines to guide administration. Raziya could become ruler at Delhi and Qutbuddin Aibak a sultan before his manumission, though neither female nor a slave can be the ruler according to strict opinion of the ulema. So long as the Sultan appointed qazis and effective arrangements existed for religious education and observance of religious practices, the religious divine did not interfere in the policy of the state.

The Sultanate was a period of economic as of political development. Metal work, sugar, indigo, and paper industry grew apace. Fine varieties of textiles, most of which had Persian or Arabic origin, were also introduced. Though most of the industries were privately owned, the economy was mixed and the government equipped and managed large-scale karkhanas, or factories, for its own needs. The contribution of the state to industrial development was not negligible, and continued during the succeeding period. Many areas around the Persian Gulf received the entire food supply from the sub-continent. Textiles were exported to South East Asia and East Africa and even reached Europe via the Red Sea, Damascus, Alexandria, and the Mediterranean. Thus, the state under the Delhi Sultanate had all the paraphernalia of a modern state—a standing army, a thriving economy based on agricultural and industrial development, and thriving international trade.

With the decline and fall of the Sultanate the fifteenth century witnessed a rich period of cultural development during the rise of the regional kingdoms. This cultural development reflected more of the indigenous stream in music and language. Politically these centrifugal tendencies created a weakness at Delhi and the sub-continent became ripe again for Babur's invasion in 1526 establishing a dynasty which was to rule for 300 years, briefly interrupted by Sher Shah's six-year rule.

Sher Shah's study of history enabled him to retain the practical aspects of the system evolved during the

Sultanate and to improve it. Akbar and the late Mughals learned much from his administration. Sher Shah established a powerful standing army officered by nobles of his choice, leaving his successors with a more efficient state security system. He also established a system of land revenue administration which is followed, with improvements, to this day.

While Sher Shah believed in decentralisation, he also believed in constant supervision. This latter desire for centralized supervision is reflected in the system of roads built by him. The present highway running from Peshawar to Karachi follows one of his four great roads. He understood fully the importance of communications in national consolidation.

Though Akbar followed the general principles of administration established by Sher Shah, provincial administration was greatly improved under Akbar. During the Mughal period, provincial boundaries were clearly defined and provincial administration was strengthened by a cadre of *mansabdars*, who could be posted from province to province by the Central Government similar to the system of deputations in modern administration. This cadre, together with financial controls, made Central authority effective.

Under the Mughals, the Central sources of revenue were land revenue, customs, profits from the mints, inheritance duties, and monopolies. Land revenue was the most important source of income. Defence, general civil administration of the empire (including the religious organizations), maintenance of the court and the royal palace, and the cost of buildings and other public works were principal items of Central Government expenditure. The provincial sources of revenue were the assignments of land revenue to cover salaries of the governor and the officials and a variety of local taxes such as cesses, transit dues and duties, and fines and presents.

Mughal rule declined amidst the din of many elements in a complex situation. Internal rebellion, the Sikh activists, the long war with the Marathas, the invasions from the North make up the curious kaliedescope of the 18th century and at the centre of all this lay the slow ascension to power of the East India Company which had, in 1612, opened its first factory, or trading post, at Surat on the west coast.

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WHAT were the causes of the decline and fall of the Mughals? Internal weakness, the lack of a competent successor for Aurangzeb, profligacy, and high consumption were some of the obvious causes. More fundamental, however, was the fact that the age of science and enlightenment had bypassed the world of Islam. Perhaps the harsh interruption of a nascent renaissance after the sack of Baghdad in the 13th century had set the seal. The medieval age had ended in 1453 when Constantinople was annexed by the Turks; but Mughal India continued to be sunk in a deep stupor.

Though Babur had introduced gunpowder in India, there was no subsequent advance in military equipment. During the same period, military science had undergone nothing short of a revolution in the West. Western naval power had thus already encircled the sub-continent, and the Indian Ocean was no longer a protective moat but a highway for foreign aggression. Pathetically helpless at sea since the days of Akbar, when Mughal ships could only sail to Mecca with a Portuguese permit, naval encirclement became a tightening noose of internal aggression. As early as the rule of Emperor Jahangir, Sir Thomas Roe had warned Jahangir that if Prince Shah Jahan as governor of Gujarat turned them out "*then he must expect we would do our justice upon the seas.*"

Henry the Eighth had established a naval dockyard in the estuary of the Thames and his successor, Elizabeth the First, Akbar's contemporary, developed England into a formidable naval power. Though the Mughal army reached the shores of the Indian Ocean in Akbar's time after the conquest of Gujarat, Akbar failed to build a navy.

Emboldened by superiority at sea the English had made an attempt to fight the Mughals in 1686, when Sir Josia Child, governor of the East India Company, sent a fleet to seize and fortify Chittagong. This failed, and was followed by expulsion of all English traders from Bengal. Angered by the seizure of a pilgrim ship and minting of coins in the Emperor's name, Aurangzeb seized the Surat factory and ordered expulsion of all Englishmen, but relented, it is said, because of the English control of the trade on the Arabian Sea and also, it appears, because they had a powerful advocate at court in the wazir, Asad Khan. Aurangzeb returned the factories after imposing a fine of one and a half lac of rupees—one of history's poorest bargains.

Later, another opportunity was lost when Aurangzeb, preoccupied in his 24 years of war with Muslim rulers of the Deccan, failed to make effective arrangements for the supervision of the defence of the west coast of India, although he did susidize briefly and ineffectively the fleet of the state of Janjira. It was not the first or last time in history tha the Muslims were too busy fighting among themselves to secure their common defence.

This relative decline in military strength was not confined to the sea. Bernier wrote in the early years of Aurangzeb's reign : "I could never see these soldiers, destitute of order and marching with the irregularity of a herd of animals, without reflecting upon the ease with which five-and-twenty thou-

sand of our veterans from the army in Flanders, commanded by Prince Conde or Marshal Turenne, would overcome these armies, however numerous."

High consumption, low production, and general decline of morals were linked with these conditions. Affluent standards of ostentation and luxury were set. Aurangzeb's puritanism did not reflect the habits of the ruling classes drowned in a life of luxury and indolence. The latter day Mughal Court was thick with an air of indiscipline, treachery, evasion of duties and corruption of the nobility.

In the last resort, the decline and fall of the Mughals must be ascribed to the weakly articulated political and social system and lack of progress in science and technology during the Mughal period. The process of Reformation escaped the sub-continent, which lay under a long eclipse while Europe basked in the glory of the Age of Renaissance, an age brighter than a thousand suns. No age of enlightenment, nor age of reason, cast its benign shadow on this region. No Galileo, Descartes, Hume, Voltaire, Kant, Hegel, or Rousseau arose. True, there were occasional geniuses like the architect of the Taj, but he did not belong to a school of architecture. Like other sciences the science of war was neglected.

Politically—and this is the fundamental factor—the causes of the supremacy of the British lay in the fact that India was not united, that it was not one nation. A country not only divided between Muslims and Hindus but between tribe and tribe, between caste and caste; a society whose framework was based on a negative equilibrium, on general repulsion and on exclusiveness between its members—was ripe for conquest. The lack of social or political consciousness or sense of nationhood was the cause of these divisions. India was never one nation, except for brief priods—the rule of Asoka, Aurangzeb, and the British —when unity was imposed from above on a plural society. A principal contradiction lay in the diffe-

rence between the Hindu and Muslim social systems. Throughout the history of the sub-continent, the social and religious differences between Hindus and Muslims, were so acute and fundamental that they raised an iron curtain between the two communities. Even seven hundred years of close residence, including two of common servitude, failed to lift this curtain.

Internal disunity created conditions for external aggression. The facts are that the paramount power of the great Mughals was broken by the Mughal viceroys ; the power of the viceroys was broken by the Mahrattas ; the power of the Mahrattas was broken by the Afghans; and while they were fighting among themselves the British rushed in and subdued them all. This internal disunity is proved by the fact that British imperialism was sustained by an army of Indians at the cost of India. The British conquest was thus historically inevitable.

Much later in time, as we reflect today, these ghosts of the past continue to rise again and again. The debate between a theocratic and modern state continues today as it did in the days of Iltutmish. Revenue assignments between Centre and provinces and their division of powers continue to exert their pulls and pushes. Road communication remains to be developed as a method of improving national consolidation. And Ayub Khan neglected the growth of the Navy as did the Mughal Kings of the past, though Pakistan is destined to be a naval nation if it is to be truly independent. Above all, the spirit of scientific enquiry; an empirical attitude ; and objective, scientific and enlightened approach are even today most visible by their absence. If nothing else, the history of Muslim civilization in India clearly illustrates that nations can ignore science and technology only at their peril, that our most urgent task is to build a modern nation state, a task that the British did not fulfil

The British broke up the handloom and destroyed the spinningwheel. From 1818 to 1836 the export of twist from Great Britain to India rose in the proportion of 1 to 5,200. The result of British Imperialism was to destroy the essential self-reliance and self-sufficiency of the villages. The peasants were thrown into a sea of woes, losing at the same time their hereditary means of subsistence without the discovery of a new economic order of liberation. The British added their own form of despotism to the already solid foundation of oriental despotism under which village communities had thrived. This oriental despotism had restrained the human mind, "making it", as Karl Marx wrote, "the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies."

Some reforms were introduced by the British. Many of these, such as the printing press, the telegraph, the railways, were the result of scientific progress in the West, but the British did not introduce heavy industry or technology. Throughout British rule the masses living in the villages continued to lead an undignified, stagnating and passive life. And imperialism left us as it found us in the embrace of a vegetable civilisation, not a machine civilization.

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ONLY a thin veneer of modernity is the legacy of the British Raj. The Muslims were subjected to a cultural aggression from which they have yet to recover. Following the failure of a mass uprising against the British, a policy of executions, confiscation of property and indiscriminate terror was let loose on the Muslims. In his famous book "The Indian Mussalman", Dr. Hunter, a member of the Civil Service, said: "A hundred and seventy years ago it was impossible for a well-born Mussalman to become poor; at present it is almost impossible for him to

continue rich. . . There is no Government office in which a Muslim can hope for any post above the rank of porter, messenger, filler of inkpots and a mender of pens." The loss of the splendid old culture, without its replacement by a scientific new culture, added a particular melancholy to the condition of Muslims during the third quarter of the 19th century.

After 1857 the whiplash of Imperialism fell mercilessly on the Muslims, who were mainly responsible for the uprising. While the massacre of Nadir Shah and the looting of Delhi by Marathas, Jats, and Afghans had continued for only a few days, in 1857 the ordeal lasted for months. British troops occupied the principal mosques. The British even thought of the sale or conversion of Jamia Masjid Delhi and it was banned for Muslims for five years.

Apart from destroying the royal palaces, the British did not spare the royal library, whose contents were mercilessly looted and scattered to all corners of the earth. The enforced dispersal of scholars meant that Lahore replaced Delhi as the cultural centre of Muslim India, and Urdu was firmly rooted in the land of the five rivers.

This pathetic condition was the inevitable consequence of the decline and fall of the Mughal empire, which began in 1707. The defeat of Siraj-ud-Daula by Clive at Plassey in 1757 established a foothold for the British and the grounds for their eventual succession. During the period between Plassey and the year 1843, when Sind was overrun by the British, or a few years later when the Punjab was annexed, the Muslims underwent many horrible indignities of which the Sikh rule in the Punjab and the sack of Delhi are outstanding examples. The pitiable plight of the Muslims created conditions for revolt against the double British-Bania dominat on and the revolt expressed itself in the demand for separate political existence.

As we have already noted it was as early as 1867 that Sir Syed Ahmed Khan mentioned the two-nation theory. During the days when the Hindi-Urdu controversy was raging, he told Mr. Shakespear, who was posted then as the Divisional Commissioner, that he was convinced "that *both* these nations will not join whole-heartedly in anything." History has borne out the accuracy of this prophecy of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. He foresaw that escape for the Muslims from their miseries lay in education and social reform. He was a moderniser and a nationalist at the same time; he believed that the resurgence of the Muslims lay in acquiring the skills and technology of the modern age in keeping with their own culture. Aligarh, the university which he founded, was a living example of this. Though Sir Syed went as far as to counsel Muslims against active participation in politics, in establishing Aligarh he had sown the seeds of modern Pakistan.

Encouraged by its monopoly of economic enterprise, the Hindu community sought to strengthen its position through the Indian National Congress founded in 1885 by a retired British civil servant, Allan Octavian Hume. Aligarh was a challenge posed to the suffocating grip of Imperialism and big business dominated by the British-Bania combination.

The seeds of the two-nation theory blossomed inevitably into a political demand for a new state. In 1879, Jamaluddin Afghani proposed the establishment of a Muslim Republic comprising the Central Asian Republics, Afghanistan and the Muslim majority areas of the sub-continent. This may have seemed far-fetched at that time, but by degrees history pushed the politically awakened Muslims towards Pakistan.

Nor is it correct to say that the recognition of a separate political existence was made by landlords and businessmen or in the courts of imperialism. A partition plan was presented at the Stockholm Conference of the Socialist International in October 1917—

the year and month of the Soviet Revolution—in a written memorandum submitted by Dr. Abdul Jabbar Kheiri and his younger brother, Professor Abdus Sattar Kheiri.

In 1927, Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi, who had taken shelter first in Russia and then in Turkey, formulated a scheme for a federal system in the sub-continent which contemplated the creation of three zones: North-Western, Eastern and Southern. The North-Western Zone was to comprise the Punjab, the Frontier Province, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan.

The annulment of the partition of Bengal under pressure from the Hindus had made the Muslims wary of future domination by the Hindus on the basis of a brute majority. Brief interludes of co-operation like the Lucknow Pact of 1916 and the Khilafat Movement itself did not cloak the growing anxieties of the Muslims who in the meantime had found a modern leader capable of leading them to victory in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The fourteen points presented by the Quaid-i-Azam in 1929 bristle with the anxieties and fears of the Muslims.

Non-acceptance of these fourteen points was perhaps the turning point in history. The moving finger of history could no longer be lured back to cancel the concept of Pakistan. A year after the fourteen points were rejected, poet Iqbal delivered his important address at the annual session of the All India Muslim League at Allahabad on December 29, 1930.

Of the fourteen points, the ninth point that Sind should be separated from Bombay was accepted in the Government of India Act, 1935. Indeed the partition of Bombay Presidency, to which many Muslim leaders, notably Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto, contributed, foreshadowed the creation of Pakistan. The principle of the Partition of India was an extrapolation of the principle on which Bombay was partitioned.

In 1938, at the Sind Provincial Muslim League conference presided over by Quaid-i-Azam, a resolution was tabled to the effect that "in the interests of unhampered cultural development, economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, India should be divided into two federations, namely, Federation of Muslim States and Federation of Non-Muslim States."

The emphasis was upon unhampered cultural development and economic and social betterment; this was the moving force behind the idea of a separate political existence. In his speech the example of the Sudetan Germans cited by the Quaid was not that of theocratic principle but the modern idea of self-determination. In comparing the demand for Pakistan to the struggle of the Sudetan Germans he was emphasizing the logic of modern nationalism as reflected in the Wilsonian ideals which held sway after the First World War.

Finally, the political goal of the Muslims was spelt out at Lahore on 23rd March 1940 with the adoption of the Pakistan Resolution, which asserted that the only constitutional arrangement acceptable to the Muslims of the sub-continent would be the one that would ensure that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted that the areas in which Muslims are numerically in majority as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states.

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IN the hearts and minds of the Muslim educated youth in the 1930's there was a growing rebellion against the dual domination of the British and the Brahman. Imperialism did little to mould the rigid social stratification implied in the caste system. Indeed

one explanation for the comparative ease of the British rule can be found in the hypothesis that the British themselves ruled as a super caste. This permanent suffocation, the curse of inequality, was not acceptable to the Muslim youth who raised the demand for a separate political existence. The concept of Pakistan thus rejected a revival of the horrors of the past and the perils of the future Muslim condition in a politically undivided sub-continent. In the words of the Quaid-i-Azam : "What is the origin of the word Pakistan ? It was not the Muslim League or the Quaid-i-Azam who coined it. Some fellows in London, who wanted a particular part of the North-West to be separated from the rest of India, coined a name in 1929-30, started the idea, and called a zone Pakistan. They picked up the letter P for Punjab, A for Afghan—as the N.W.F.P. is known even today, K for Kashmir, S for Sind, and Tan for Baluchistan. A name was coined."

The Muslims were indeed the rural proletariat of the sub-continent. Looked upon with suspicion by the British invaders, a suspicion which was confirmed by the events of 1857, Muslim India came in for special treatment under the backlash of the post-1857 British policy. Democracy means the rule of the majority, and Muslims looked with trepidation upon a permanent subjugation under a caste-ridden society obsessed with racial memories and historical revenge. The practical opposition to the partition of Bengal and experience of Congress Government from 1937 onwards confirmed this fear. In the meanwhile the sub-continent's population was exploding since the 1921 census, and as new waves of educated youth started competing for diminishing economic space communalism deepened. Independence for the Muslims meant the substitution of one kind of domination for another. Only a state of their own could guarantee true independence. It was these conceptions which lay at the root of the demand for Pakistan. Its political

mentor was Quaid -i-Azam; its intellectual exponent was Allama Iqbal. Both agreed on fundamentals.

There are those who ask that if Pakistan is a nation state merely because its people share the same religion why should its boundaries be confined to Pakistan alone. There is hardly any dividing line between the Ideology of Pakistan and a Pan-Islamic destiny. Such an approach overlooks two crucial factors. First of all, it overlooks the point that the concept of Pakistan includes the fact that Muslims were a minority in the sub-continent. Separation was not sought merely on the grounds of a difference in religion and culture but in order to escape the tyranny of the majority. Had the Muslims been in a majority, the demand for Pakistan would not have arisen. Thus, it was the compulsion of modern political democracy which propelled the demand for Pakistan. Secondly, it is obvious that the decision to have only one state of all the Muslims of the world is not within the reach of Pakistani Muslims alone. Such a decision would simultaneously have to be taken by all other Muslim states. The experience of some attempts at forming federations among Muslim states shows that the will to Pan-Islamism is not so strong throughout the Muslim world.

Others who question the concept of Pakistan belong to the extreme "left". Ignoring the revolutionary forces of history which propelled the Pakistan movement their simplistic view is that Pakistan is a symbol of theocratic reaction. They ignore that in the conflict between Hindu-Brahmanism and Islam, it is Islam which is the progressive force in the sub continent. They sit and dream and gossip in coffee shops and call themselves revolutionaries. Their love for humanity and proletarian internationalism overlooks the objective conditions of the world today. After all, even according to doctrinaire dogmatists the withering away of the state is not around the corner. In any case the states cannot wither away until nuclear

weapons are first destroyed. The road to world socialism is long and steep. In the meanwhile, the socialist countries are emphasizing patriotism and stressing national independence.

Our friends of the extremes, whether the Right utopians dreaming of Pan-Islamism or the Left utopians dreaming of socialism in the abstract, represent a distraction from the imperative of the existence of Pakistan. Pakistan has to be recognized as an end in itself, not as a means to an end. The question is not whether Pakistan is good for some other purpose but whether a particular system is good for Pakistan. Right and Left utopians alike are guil y of eroding patriotism. Historically, too, they have links outside Pakistan. On the 'right' are aligned the parties who opposed the creation of Pakistan as un-Islamic. This includes the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam which is an offshoot of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind. On the 'left' was the NAP which was a conglomeration of former members of the Indian National Congress or their allies and admirers. The Communist parties in Pakistan were also historically linked with the Indian Communist Parties. Some of their representatives were in NAP. For the first time a number of progressive elements have emerged who are at the same time fiercely patriotic. Most of these elements are in the Pakistan People's Party. The difference between the progress've elements in the Pakistan People's Party and the utopian 'left' is that the former do not reject our history or deny our Islamic heritage. Whether a movement or religion is revolutionary or reactionary has to be judged with reference to history.

No one can deny that Islam which was introduced during the period of *Jahiliyya* was a revolutionary force in Arabia. It gave rights of inheritance to women whose unenviable privilege in the previous society was literally a living death. It imposed the concept of a common goal and the development of unity and

brotherhood instead of war among the tribes. Thus Islam was a factor of revolution in the situation of Arabia in those days. Shelley, the great romantic poet, recognized this in his poem "The Revolution of Islam".

As far as Muslim civilisation in the sub-continent is concerned its introduction has been even more important in its liberalising influence. Pre-Hindu civilisation of Moenjodaro and Harappa and even the Buddhist civilisation did not recognize barriers between man and man. As opposed to this, Hindu civilisation built a barrier of caste between man and man. It was the force of Islam which revived in the valley of Indus the basic concept of the equality of man.

Before a classless society can be developed, it is a necessary condition to establish a casteless society because caste is more rigid and reactionary than class. The caste system offers no hope of escape. It permits no dialectic. As opposed to this the class system, involving class struggle, is a system of dialectical mobility. Thus conceived Pakistan is an antithesis to the iniquity and domination of the Hindu social system.

Thus, before we can strive for a classless society it is essential to create a casteless society. The effect of Muslim civilisation has been to present an antithesis to caste—the doctrine of permanent inequality among men. That is why it is possible for a more revolutionary line to be adopted in Pakistan. Neither an after-thought nor special pleading is implicit in this interpretation. Pakistan, as a nation state where a more revolutionary line could be pursued free from the oppressive casteism of Brahmanism, was clearly and explicity foreseen by the intellectual mentor of the state—Allama Iqbal.

* * *

AFTER the decline of the Muslim rule in the sub-continent and particularly after the War of Independence of 1857 two different schools of Muslim thought emerged. One school of thought represented escape into the past from the reality of defeat; escape from science itself. Not only imperialism but also its technological arm—the railway, the motor cars, electricity—were seen as evil. A retreat from modernity accompanied the old culture. A new culture, however, arose and the representative of this new culture was Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan argued that we should study the systems of western countries and develop a spirit of scientific enquiry and take from them all that was worthwhile, while at the same time maintaining our culture and linguistic identity: in short, a quest for renaissance, a quest that was philosophically defended by Allama Iqbal and politically achieved by Quaid-i-Azam, who himself represented the new scientific, modern, confident Muslims, poised for a renaissance. Thus, Pakistan represents the urge for modernity, for revolution.

Considerable stress was placed by Iqbal on the anti-classicism of the Quran. Nature, history, and inner experience are the three sources of knowledge open to man, but it is in tapping the first two sources of knowledge, says Iqbal, that the spirit of Islam is seen at its best. In "The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam", Iqbal complains that the study of Greek philosophy by the Muslim thinkers obscured their vision of the Quran. Iqbal criticized the idealism of the early Greek philosophers and their disregard of the material world. "Socrates concentrated his attention on the human world alone", writes Iqbal. "To him the proper study of man was man and not the world of plants, insects and stars. How unlike the spirit of the Quran, which sees in the humble bee a recipient of divine inspiration and constantly calls upon the reader to observe the perpetual change of the winds, the alternation of

day and night, the clouds, the starry heavens, and the planets swimming through infinite space."

In his letter to Quaid-i-Azam written only a few months before his death, Allama Iqbal said: "*The problem of bread is becoming more and more acute.* The Muslim has begun to feel that he has been going down and down during the last 200 years. The issue between social democracy and Brahmanism is not dissimilar to the one between Brahmanism and Buddhism. Whether the fate of socialism will be the same as the fate of Buddhism in India I cannot say. But it is clear to my mind that if Hinduism accepts social democracy it must necessarily cease to be Hinduism. For Islam the acceptance of social democracy in some suitable form and consistent with the legal principles of Islam is not a revolution but a return to the original purity of Islam. *The modern problems therefore are far more easy to solve for the Muslims than for the Hindus*. But, as I have said above, in order to make it possible for Muslim India to solve these problems it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities."

It is important to note that the first question the Allama poses is the question of bread; how to solve the problem of Muslim poverty? The answer he proposes is socialism which he equates with social democracy; but he fears that socialism in India will flounder on the Brahmanic caste system whereas between Islam and social democracy there do not lie insuperable barriers. Thus, in order to solve the problem of bread among the Muslims, it is necessary for them to have a free state of their own. According to the Allama it is easier for Pakistan to become a modern scientific state than for caste-ridden India.

Unfortunately the Quaid's replies to these letters are not available, though the Quaid stated in his preface to the letters that the Allama's views were "substantially in consonance with my own and had

finally led me to the same conclusions." The fact that the Quaid's views were much the same is borne out by his views expressed in an interview reported by the Associated Press of America. According to the report, politically the Pakistan of the Quaid's vision would be a democracy. The Quaid hoped its major industries and public utility services would be socialized. Thus, both the Allama and the Quaid foresaw Pakistan as a modern, social democracy, not as a theocratic state. They equally understood that a state of their own was necessary in order to end exploitation. In the words of the Quaid: "A united India means a Hindu-dominated India. It means that and nothing else." It is significant that the Quaid had come to this conclusion through bitter experience. He was driven to this conclusion by the attitude of the Hindu Congress. In his early political life he was not only a prominent leader of the Congress but also a principal exponent of Hindu-Muslim unity. Indeed he was described as the ambass ador of this unity. This enlightened advocate of liberal causes came to accept the necessity of Pakistan through experience of Hindu domination.

Caste Hindus dominated in all spheres of power: eduction, banks, insurance, trade and industry. Cotton grown by the peasants of Sind and Punjab filled the coffers of Hindu-owned textile mills. Leaders of the Hindu-majority party, the Congress, and the extreme parties alike bitterly resisted the concept of Pakistan. The Quaid's singlemindedness and the heroic sacrifice of the Muslim masses made Pakistan inevitable. The road to Pakistan is paved with the blood of Muslim masses.

The concept of Pakistan has a historical genesis. It represented the Mussalman's quest for modernization. It reflected the desire for unhampered cultural development and economic and social betterment of the Muslims. The real problem was

the problem of bread among the Muslims. A modern state with a socialist economy was necessary to rid the Muslims of backwardness.

Apart from its philosophical, historical and economic foundations there are many other reasons for Pakistan. Pakistan has one national language; it has one economy ; one river system. It offers no insuperable difficulties. It represents the self-determination of the people freely expressed. It is an organic concept. It is a product of history.

Pakistan represents another progressive principle —the exercise of the right of self-determination. Some people say that the leadership was in the hands of feudals and rich businessmen. But even they were playing a revolutionary role against the British-Bania combine which was the holder of economic power. The concept of Pakistan is a modern concept of a state geographically existent in the valley of the Indus, from the mighty Karakorams to the Arabian sea, with one national language, seeking modernization of its economy and politics based on the exercise of the right of self-determination.

The salvation of Pakistan lies in its unity, freedom of existence and a just social order for the masses. Its cardinal goals are national consolidation, modernization, scientific culture, mass politics, liberty, and socialism. Essential to the salvation of the masses, of the Pakistan solution to the problem of poverty is the concept of an indivisible political and economic entity. Divisions which are created are superimposed and artificial and have to be combated by a political and economic system, a system which can ensure harmony of personal choices with the supreme national interest. The history of Pakistan will demonstrate that our successes have been in the affirmation of these political ideals of the founding fathers, that our failures are marked by straying from the essential task of Pakistan—a quest for modernization.

CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE

High hopes had accompanied the creation of Pakistan. It was the promised land born in the womb of historical dialectics. But on the morning after the day of Independence, a new nation had not risen like a phoenix from the ashes. Independence meant no change for the village poor, who were oppressed by the legacies of the past and were caught in the twin despotism of a feudalism and colonialism associated with police stations, poverty, illiteracy and disease. As the years passed, it dawned on the people that national reconstruction was not a romance; that utopia was far away; that Pakistan's independence was a challenge of change, not an overnight metamorphosis; that bigger tasks lay ahead of and not behind independence.

The high ideals which had accounted for the formation of the State contrasted sharply with some of the practices. Heavy as the mountains lay the debris of colonialism on the shoulders of the poor masses. As the 1950's unfolded, the revolution of rising expectations turned sour into a revolution of rising frustrations—and then in the 1960's the dark clouds of secession began to appear. At the time of independence, it was a common fallacy that since imperialism had exploited the poor nations, only independence would release the mainsprings of a new tomorrow. This assumption overlooked the fact that the circumstances which had made imperialism possible would continue to obstruct social, economic and political development.

It is a well-known fact of history that the Second World War greatly upset the distribution of power. The end of British empire was one of the consequences of this redistribution. As the evening sun of imperialism began to set from the shores of the China Sea to the waters of the Caribbean, the liberation of vast numbers of people from colonial rule was the beginning of a new saga in the life of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Essential elements in this odyssey were : diminished prestige of colonial powers who had lost to the Japanese in the early stages of the War; increasing forces of nationalism in Asia; and rapid emergence of the power of the United States of America and the USSR. Indeed the ascendance of some of these factors was visible during the priod following the First World War. The very concept of the League of Nations bore the seeds of the idea of equality of States. Even if the ideals of the right of self-determination, as stated in the League of Nations charter, had not always worked to the best advantage of colonised peoples, it nevertheless symbolised that in the realm of super structures there was a visible shift from Kipling's ideology of the white man's burden to Woodrow Wilson's ideology of the self-governance of colonised people.

In the period after the Second World War, the momentum gathered and the forces against imperialism became irresistible. One of the many circumstances giving rise to the situation was that, with full employment guaranteed as a social and political right after the Second World War, it became difficult to fuel the apparatus of the state from the imperialist base. At the same time each imperial power had tried to create an indigenous ruling class. For this, education was necessary; if nothing else, to translate the grievances of the masses to government and the dictates of government to the masses. And then the sepoys were needed to fight. In 1885, the high noon of colonialism, there were 154,000 Indians to 73,000

British in the Indian army. By the time of Pakistan, only 8,000 British officers were in the war-swollen Indian army. This indigenous, educated elite—the product of secondary schools and colleges, established by colonial masters, the class which was supposed to uphold imperialism—turned into a revolutionary class attacking imperialism at its foundations.

Thus, to a large extent, the national liberation movement originated among the local elites soaked in western political ideology. Like capitalism creates the proletariat, imperialism in its high noon bred a revolutionary class among the intellectuals it produced. The intellectuals of Asia, Africa and Latin America thus became the proletarian vanguard in the attack against imperialism. A distinction, however, is necessary between those among the educated classes who were not in government and those who were in service. The former alone can be classified as a revolutionary class.

Each Imperialist power set its own conditions for national liberation. In the case of British colonies, these movements essentially followed the pattern of the Chartist's demands in Britain in the 1830's which had led to the Age of Reform. There were singularly few attempts to overthrow the British Empire by force. Alternatively, the British were wise enough to leave before a violent overthrow became possible. Decolonization by violence became necessary in those cases where the Imperialist power failed to grant independence, creating the conditions for a violent overthrow. The anti-Japanese war in China and Korea and the war for liberation of Algeria and Vietnam are prominent examples. Thus, both the intensity of colonial rule and manner of its passing had profound effects on the new independent states.

In the case of countries like India where the national independence movements followed the constitutional pattern, one of the consequences of attainment of power was that while the educated

classes outside government had played a revolutionary role, the governing elites continued to be as removed from the masses as the former colonial rulers. Another consequence of the transfer of power was that while the colonial rulers were basically concerned to rule, the new governments following independence expressed themselves invariably in favour of the construction of a democratic welfare state. Unfortunately, while the eyes were fixed on the spires of Westminster the machinery of the government was not designed to serve the ideals of parliamentary rule. As the long shadow between the utopian ideas of the new rulers and the slow pace of reform widened, attention fastened on the need for a revolution in attitudes and institutions without which the ideals could not be translated into practice. The period after the transfer of power can thus rightly be described as the period of the aftermath of colonialism and not true independence, which remained a myth.

The comparative experience of China, Vietnam, North Korea and Algeria teaches us that one of the results of peaceful constitutional liberation is that the state that arises from peaceful liberation is too soft. Lord Wavell's diary* testifies that the British were not unaware of this consequence and realised that those countnes which had been through the fire of internal revolution and external invasion would be tougher, while those who had not would inherit a soft state, a machinery unable to implement the radical changes required if modernization was to be achieved.

An important difference between nations which have secured national independence by fighting and those which have not, is that the former acquire a sense of self-confidence and self-reliance; a sense of equality of nations. Nations such as these have not banished the ghost of colonialism with the ballot but

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* See Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal, OUP, 1973, Lahore, p. 90

cut it to shreds with the sword. Moreover, such nations are endowed with a band of cadres, brave, disciplined and practised in protracted struggle who can use the expertise of the war of liberation to launch a protracted war against poverty and disease. The patriotism of these cadres who had staked their lives for the country's honour is unquestionable; their political consciousness and commitment unqualified and their practice of working together under difficult, even dangerous conditions, invaluable in the tasks that lie after independence. It is this element which is missing in Pakistan. True, there were heroic sacrifices; but those who suffered were innocent victims of communal frenzy rather than martyrs of national liberation.

A sense of national unity in the hearts and minds of its citizens is a fundamental precondition for the construction of a nation-state, a task which can only be undertaken by its people. As long as individuals primarily identify themselves with family, tribe, caste, village or province, their supreme loyalty to the nation-state is denied. It is for this reason that national unity is problematical in nation-states suddenly gaining independent status unless the people have experienced the struggle for national independence as a positive goal of national liberation. If their loyalties have always, been narrowly defined, they cannot be expected to respond affirmatively to the dictates of a new order without first having been conditioned to understand their place in it. Thus, the main task inherited from the day Pakistan was born was the task of national consolidation and it remains the supreme objective today—a true national consolidation embedded in the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan.

While there are grounds for self-criticism, the achievements are no less profound. As sympathetic an observer as Myrdal concludes that it is hard to conceive of a modern state which started its

independent existence on as tenuous a basis as Pakistan —split into two wings. divided by over a thousand miles of hostile territory; with its vital arteries severed in the process of the partition of Punjab; the frontiers with India cutting across the extensive and all-important irrigation networks, leaving several vital headworks in Kashmir and India; less industrialized than India and with fewer natural resources; with no major firms, hardly any banks, and virtually no industry; and received a proportionately larger number of refugees. In the absence of an established political and administrative capital or commercial and financial centres, Pakistan had to construct the entire apparatus of government and business. Born in communal strife and political and economic chaos and bordered by hostile neighbours, the country's mere survival as a political unit was remarkable. To compound these difficulties, the nation's leader who had steered the tortuous and precipitous path to Independence died on September 11, 1948, before the nation could come to grips with the grave consequences of Pakistan, to be followed by the assassination of his successor Shaheed-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan only three years later.

A bloodbath of unprecedented magnitude accompanied the birth of the country. Serious communal disorders resulting in heavy loss of life had begun in 1946. In a rising crescendo, the communal riots in 1947 led to the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives. By the time of transfer of power, a state of civil war prevailed. Ferocious killing broke out after the Boundary Commission award and several weeks of civil war in which thousands more perished, caused the biggest mass migration of populations ever recorded in recent history, involving in the first four months after partition more than 8,500,000 refugees, of whom those coming to Pakistan accounted for more than 4 million.

In the wake of Partition, there arose many actual and artificial frontier problems. Pakistan was engaged in frontier problems from the day it was born, particularly the Kashmir problem and the Afghan stunt of promoting an independent Pathan State.

Pakistan has made many attempts to create understanding with Afghanistan, but the previous Afghan governments did not always pay attention to Pakistan's desire for friendship. Those who espouse Pakhtoonistan overlook two factors; firstly, that the Pathans themselves do not want a separate state as expressed in the Referendum and secondly, that the true logic of a linguistic state would entail the dismemberment of Afghanistan which has many linguistic groups other than Pakhtoons. These and other objective factors will, it is hoped, prevail in giving a political framework to the deep-rooted cultural homogeneities and geo-economic complementaries which tie Afghanistan's people and economy to Pakistan. Nor can it be forgotten that the name of Sir Mortimer Durand was proposed by the Afghan ruler. Touching the frontiers of independence can reopen many issues. Many questions could arise. If the issue is raised of shifting the chains from Torkham to Hassan Abdal, somebody could well ask why not shift the chains from Torkham to Jalalabad ? Why not Kabul ? Nor would it be the first time in history that Jalalabad and Kabul are ruled from Lahore.

Another frontier problem was created when Indian troops occupied Kashmir and a shotgun accession was arranged on October 27, 1947. The Kashmir dispute involves two fundamental elements. One is that there is an international agreement between India and Pakistan, endorsed by the United Nations, which calls for a decision on Kashmir according to the wishes of the people of Kashmir. Secondly, there is an important fundamental principle of the twentieth century involved—the right of self-determination. This right of self-determination

is an intrinsic right, a natural right of the people of Kashmir; neither has this right been conferred on the people of Kashmir by Pakistan nor is it for Pakistan to take it away.

In addition to the intractable land frontiers there was the problem of the division of Indus waters with India. A serious anomaly of the Boundary Commission Award was that while the bulk of the Punjab irrigation system was in Pakistan, many of the canal headworks were in India. This led to prolonged dispute between the two countries which was not resolved until the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, which, unsatisfactorily for Pakistan, allocates the waters of the three eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas and Sutlej—to India, with certain exceptions, and the waters of the three western rivers—Indus, Jhelum and Chenab—for the use of Pakistan. During the transition period, Pakistan has constructed a system of works, part of which will replace, from the western rivers, those irrigation uses in Pakistan which have hitherto been met from the eastern rivers.

A necessary consequence of these events was that the resources of the new state—economic, political and administrative, had to be diverted to the resettlement of the refugees, heavy expenditure on replacement of waters and necessary defence preparations, leaving little for the task of modernization and economic development of Pakistan.

From the day Pakistan was born, another aggression commenced, the battle for the minds of the youth. In order to destroy Pakistan, the enemies of its existence, internal and external, poisoned it with the cancer of provincialism from the time of its birth. On the eve of his departure after a nine-day visit to East Pakistan in March 1948, the Founder of the State, with prophetic insight forewarned the nation that "cohesion and solidarity amongst all its (Pakistan's) citizens, from whatever part they may

come, is essential for its progress, nay for its very survival...That is why I want you to be on your guard against this poison of provincialism that our enemies wish to inject into our State."

Twenty-seven years later, the Prime Minister of Pakistan presented a fundamental analysis of this corrosive phenomenon in the body politic during the Budget Session of 1975. To quote : "In the newly independent Pakistan an antidiluvian troika of habits and attitudes, nepotism[1] favouritism/provincialism and corruption, soon came to buttress the vested interests against the masses; the corrupt against the honest; the strong against the weak. A corrupt official including a Minister would seek to protect himself from public scrutiny by appealing to nepotism and favouritism first and provincialism second. Thus, self-interest of self-seekers was elevated to the level of ideology. When appeals are made to these ideals, it is mostly the temper of the individuals that is involved and not the temper of the issues. When the self-interest of self-seekers is elevated to the level of ideology it appears in the shape of nepotism, favouritism, corruption and, *if all else fails, provincialism*."

Another problem which the new state had to face was the early confrontation with democracy. As in all other liberated states it was commonly agreed that Pakistan would be a democratic welfare state where sovereignty resided with the people. To the legally trained politicians of the early years this meant the adoption of the British form of parliamentary government. Bequeathed with Independence was a Constituent Assembly indirectly elected by representatives from the provincial legislatures who had to frame a constitution and act as the national legislature until a general election could be held. Because of the failure of this Assembly to frame a constitution, it took almost a decade to frame Pakistan's first constitution in 1956. No general elections were held until the declaration of Martial Law in 1958. Prior

to this overt departure from constitutional norms in 1958, parliamentary government was arbitrarily suspended, once at the centre and several times for considerable periods in the provinces. Military rule was twice imposed over large areas and public meetings frequently banned.

A superficial analysis would ascribe these departures from stability and discipline to the intrigues of irresponsible politicians, but the causes lay deeper, namely, the reluctance of the ruling upper strata to seek electoral support for their policies. Increasingly separated from the masses, the leaders felt a genuine difficulty of trying to explain how an Islamic state could have modern institutions not only to the illiterate poor but to their educated countrymen and even to themselves. Having promised nothing but freedom from Hindu domination and having failed to make a blue-print for Pakistan according to the concepts of Allama Iqbal and the Quaid-i-Azam, they were in no position to lead.

Although the students, the middle classes, peasants, and workers had all participated alike in the struggle for Pakistan, political power was concentrated in a narrow elite and the masses conveniently forgotten. The class interests of those who came to power militated against the establishment of a truly democratic state. The civil servants and officer corps were waiting in the wings. The unabashed scramble for the spoils of office immediately after independence only confirmed their colonial attitude that politicians only make "a mess of things". The poor masses who had secured the inevitability of Pakistan with their blood on the railway stations of Ludhiana, Jullundhur, Amritsar, Delhi and Monghyr were forgotten as power passed to a feudal bureaucratic elite backed by force.

Dedicated to its perpetuation, the first ConstituentAssembly turned into a Long Parliament playing

a game of constitutional charade. By the time the Pakistan Constituent Assembly opened on October 7, 1953, to debate the report of the Basic Principles Committee appointed in 1949, the first blow had already been struck at the institution of Parliamentary Democracy. In April 1953, Khwaja Nazimuddin had been abruptly and unceremoniously dismissed by the Governor-General. This Vice-Regal act rather shabbily but effectually demonstrated that *de facto* power had passed to the bureaucratic elite. The Constituent Assembly at first succumbed to this brute display of power by voting its confidence in the nominee of the Governor-General. In fighting a rearguard battle, the Constituent Assembly in October 1954 tried to curtail the powers of Governor-General, but this caper was its swan song for the Governor-General of Pakistan issued a declaration proclaiming a state of emergency declaring that the Constituent Assembly could "no longer function". This unhappy choice of phrase barely concealed the existence of a civilian coup d'etat.

In the indirect elections to the new Pakistan Constituent Assembly which were held on June 21, 1955, no one party secured a majority, the results being as follows: Muslim League 25, United Front 16, Awami League 13, Independents 4 (including 2 Non-Muslim members), Pakistan National Congress 4, Scheduled Castes Federation 3, "Noon group" 3, United Progressive Parliamentary Party 2, Azad Pakistan Party 1, Communists 1. The Assembly met for the first time on July 7. Although this Assembly adopted a Constitution on February 29, 1956, being indirectly elected it lacked the mandate to exercise sovereignty on behalf of the people. Failure to hold direct elections added to the process of cumulative causation leading to the failure of democratic institutions.

In the case of Pakistan, the price of failure of democracy was the dissolution of the State. Pakistan's

geography from its birth to dismemberment required a federal structure and the fundamental task of the people's representatives was to frame a constitution which would embody the principles on which the federating units were to live together. The document embodying such an agreement called the Constitution would have constituted the foundation of the new state. This lack of fundamental consensus provided an opportunity to the enemies of Pakistan to whip up provincialistic frenzy reminiscent of the communal frenzy of 1947 till it led to the dismemberment of Pakistan. The Pakistan that emerged was close to Allama Iqbal's and indeed Rahmat Ali's vision. Rahmat Ali had also envisaged more than one Muslim state. Indeed he had thought of a third State, Usmanistan (Hyderabad).

It is an irony of history that during the period when the centrifugal forces were at work under the compulsions of two geo-economies a centripetal administrative structure was imposed while now that Pakistan, after the secession of its Eastern Wing, is clearly one geo-economy the centrifugal tendencies are fed by its administrative structure. Pakistan's eventual salvation lies in a unitary state based on Pakistani nationalism alone and predicated upon one economy.

CHAPTER V

THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE TASKS

AFTER Bangladesh, Pakistan no longer suffers from geographical incontinuity. Pakistan has a population of nearly 70 million. Its population is likely to be stabilised at well over a 100 million by the end of the century. Whereas Pakistan consists of four provinces: Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan, the provincial boundaries are not co-extensive with linguistic or ethnic frontiers. More than 60 per cent of the population lives in the province of the Punjab.

Pakistani society is semi-feudal, semi-capitalist, semi-independent, semi-socialist, semi-managerial and semi-democratic. In short, it is a mixed society. It is semi-colonial also as it carries many traces of its colonial past.

During the colonial period, the foundations of the self-sufficient village economy and self-governing village polity of feudal times was destroyed. For this reason, our society is semi-feudal. Pakistani society is semi-capitalist because though capitalism developed to a certain extent and has played a considerable part in Pakistan's political and cultural life, it was not risk capital based on thrift but a flabby capitalism based on borrowing, government patronage and international doles. Since our economy is predominantly agricultural and we do not have a capitalist agriculture, capitalism did not become the principal pattern of Pakistan's economy. For this reason also, our society is semi-capitalist.

Pakistan is semi-democratic because it has passed through many years of undemocratic rule, encompassing the entire 1960's. Though democratic institutions have been established since December 1971, there is an absence of attitudes and institutions which buttress democracy—tolerance, trial and error, party discipline. Since democratic institutions are new, the government, business officers and managers play an important part; hence Pakistan is semi-managerial. Imperialism no longer controls Pakistan's vital financial and economic arteries, but it influences her because Pakistan depends for defence and development on international assistance and, till recently, for food grains. For these reasons, Pakistan is semi-imperialist. Pakistan has undertaken a wide range of reforms, and the commanding heights of the economy—large industry, cotton ginning, rice milling, flour milling, shipping, large sectors of foreign trade, banking, insurance, oil distribution and refining—have been socialized. But most of Pakistan's economy is under private ownership. For this reason, Pakistan is semi-socialist.

However, the main trend in Pakistan's society is democracy. Thus, it can be said that Pakistani society is semi-feudal, semi-capitalist, semi-imperialist and semi-managerial, but that it is developing along democratic lines towards a modern nation-state.

Pakistan's economic, social and cultural development is uneven. Some parts are more prosperous than the other parts; as a whole, the town people are better off than the villagers. Thus, urbanization is a major process in Pakistan. The poverty of Pakistan's people is on a scale seldom found elsewhere. Such are the characteristics of Pakistani society today.

The contradiction between the town and the country, between feudal attitudes of the village and the democratic norms of the cities, is a basic contradiction in the modern Pakistani society. In the contradiction between the town and the country, the

town represents the historically progressive force. In the contradiction between feudalism and the bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie represents the progressive class.

Therefore, the first and principal task of all Pakistanis is to curb all feudal tendencies by means of a social revolution dedicated to nation-building in which all the people including the services, workers, the middle class, the lower middle class, the rich and poor peasant, and small capitalist classes are to take part. This social revolution would consist of liberating Pakistani society from all the fetters of attitudes, principally feudalism, which have obstructed Pakistan's rendezvous with history.

This social revolution is entirely different from the revolutions in the advanced countries. Pakistan's social revolution will result not in the rule of the bourgeoisie but in the rule of all the patriotic elements in society. The democratic revolutions of the advanced countries led by capitalists resulted in imperialism, but Pakistan's social revolution opposes imperialism—it is a force for revolution.

Pakistan's social revolution taken as a whole involves abolition of feudalism, that is, substituting superstition by science; corruption by honesty; nepotism, favouritism and sifarish by the principle to each according to his work for the country and from each according to his ability. This principle is now part of our constitution.

This revolutionary task has to be fulfilled by a united front of the workers, peasants, services, students and working intellectuals, without whose leadership the revolution cannot succeed. This entire process constitutes what is defined as a social revolution.

Pakistan's natural development has been telescoped. There is no time to think of the bourgeoisie revolution as a necessary preparation for the socialist

revolution, and the socialist revolution as the inevitable sequel to the bourgeoisie revolution. Three quarters of the twentieth century have elapsed. Time's winged chariot hurries near. The process of the social revolution as a whole is telescoped as the people of Pakistan fight what might by their last battle for national independence and state sovereignty in an extremely complex and dangerous world as full of portents as of opportunities.

What is the political condition in Pakistan and in the world today? We have a neighbour where live many who still cherish the dream of total dismemberment of Pakistan. Another neighbouring country, which is a Muslim country, has since the inception of Pakistan been making wild claims on a considerable part of our country not without encouragement. Due to its geographical position, Pakistan has also become a centre of rivalry between two super powers. The problem of Kashmir remains to be solved.

Due to an acute crisis in the world economy, people of Pakistan have to face hardships and numerous difficulties in the form of high prices and unemployment. Corruption, nepotism, favouritism resist eradication. The forces of the utopiains of the extreme right and left since the inception of Pakistan have been busy sowing discord among the people living in different provinces. These utopians have tried their best to create disunity among the people in the name of sectarianism, provincialism and nationalities.

Our aim has to be to build a modern and scientific society and a modern and scientific state for Pakistan, a society with scientific economics, politics and culture. Experience has shown us that we cannot save Pakistan unless we build a modern Pakistan with technological teeth. This modern Pakistan requires the end of exploitation, internal and external, which, in turn, is only possible if an enlightened and

progressive Pakistan under the sway of a cultural renaissance is also built; which alone can break the deadlock of centuries—ignorance, disease, backwardness, corruption and oppression.

True enough, this is the period of the final struggle of dying imperialism and expansionism. But just because it is dying, imperialism and expansionism are all the more dependent on external adventures, wars on colonies and semi-colonies for survival, for resources, and will certainly not allow any semi-independent country like ours to establish anything like a truly modern industrial society. The enemies of our national independence and survival will block the road of an agricultural and industrial revolution in countries like Pakistan. Similarly, the opposition to reforms is not on principle but because it will make us strong. Throughout history they have been equally opposed to national capitalism. The enemies of Pakistan and of other countries of the Third World are opposed to our modernization; to our acquiring strength.

A modern Pakistan can alone establish a true national independence. The enemies of Pakistan, in collusion with the utopians of the left and right, will try and secure the restoration of reaction in the country. In Pakistan, the whole people, the proletariat, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, the nationalistic civil servant, small industrialist and other patriotic sections of the people constitute the basic forces determining Pakistan's fate. These classes, some already awakened and others in the process of awakening, will necessarily have to become the basic components of the state and governmental structure in Pakistan's democracy, for they alone are committed to Pakistan's survival as an independent state.

Pakistan's democracy is different from the old western form of capitalist republic representing the

interests of the classes not the masses. It is different from the socialist republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat alone which become the dominant form of state and governmental structure in industrially advanced socialist countries. For a long historical period, this form is not suitable for our revolutions. During this period, therefore, a third form of democracy must be adopted, namely, the rule of all the patriotic elements including workers, peasants, working intellectuals, the small industrialists, national bourgeoisie, the nationalist managers and civil servants.

The road ahead is hard and uphill. In the absence of an implementation apparatus it is not possible to introduce a full-fledged revolution today, which only provides a comprehensive solution to the worst problems of inflation and unemployment with which we are beset. The present task of the people of Pakistan is to fight the forces of imperialism and expansionism and hegemonism externally and utopianism internally, of building new organs and institutions capable of implementing a revolutionary programme. This step will need quite a long time and cannot be accomplished overnight. We are not utopians and cannot divorce ourselves from the actual conditions confronting us. It is, therefore, necessary to concentrate on the principle problem—the end of feudalism.

How are these goals to be achieved ? By relying upon the masses. As every schoolboy knows, more than 70 per cent of Pakistan's population are peasants. So the peasant problem becomes the basic problem of Pakistan and the strength of the peasants is the main strength of Pakistan, their weakness our biggest weakness. So, if we have to make Pakistan strong, the peasant must be made strong. This is basic. There are a few million industrial workers in Pakistan and several more handicraft workers, artisans and agricultural labourers. Pakistan cannot survive without

her workers in the various industries, because they are the producers in the industrial sector of the economy. The majority of the government servants can be relied upon in nation-building tasks. At the time when Pakistan was made, the services played a heroic role in building the new state. And the revolution cannot succeed without the support of the services.

The class which will obstruct national progress most are the feudals and the capitalists. It is important to recall that the Pakistan movement was not led by these elements. Throughout the 1930's, the movement materialised in the hearts and minds of the urban educated youth. To the contrary, the masses forced the feudal elements to join the Pakistan movement. Though they joined late, the feudal elements dominated Pakistani politics for a time because when it came to parliamentary representation, they secured many of the seats.

Many difficult organizational tasks have to be accomplished before the masses can be galvanised towards revolutionary construction of a modern Pakistan. But before we can begin to even address ourselves to this task we have to address ourselves to a cultural revolution. People's attitudes, ideas, customs, habits, political views, legal and moral concepts, literature and arts—all these which go by the name of superstructure or what is more popularly called culture—have to undergo modernization before society can be modernized. A people who are prey to superstitions, tribal loyalties, feuds, provincialism, favouritism and nepotism cannot build, by accident as it were, a modern state.

There are in Pakistan three cultures. First, an imported culture fostered by films and magazines, by cultural organizations, and by a number af Pakistanis. Pakistan also has a semi-feudal culture which reflects here semi-feudal politics and economy. Both the

imported and feudal cultures have positive elements. The third culture, not fully developed, is a national culture. It is a mixture of Muslim ethics, imported culture and semi-feudal culture. In fact, it is linked with modernisation. This third culture, the Anglo-Mohammedan oriental culture begins in the days of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan who first taught respect for science and technology. It is recounted in the book "History of the M.A.O. College" that in February 1904, the M.A.O. College Union rejected a motion that the study of the Arabic language and culture was the most essential step for the welfare of the Muslim community. Allama Iqbal epitomises this national culture which teaches us respect for our traditions and for modern revolution. In his "Shikwah" and "Jawab-i-Shikwah" is contained the entire Muslim dilemma.

This national culture is not to be equated with imported culture or simple westernisation. It takes into account and encompasses the many splendid aspects of the old culture developed during Mughal times. Thus, on the one hand, we do not want to close our windows on the world, nor do we want to reject our old culture. We should assimilate whatever is useful to us today not only from the present-day socialist and democratic cultures but also from the earlier cultures of other nations, for example, from the culture of the European countries in the age of Enlightenment and Renaissance. At the same time we want to retain the fine old culture of the people developed during the Mughal period. The national culture, we advocate, is a synthesis but it is uncompromising on certain essentials; it is scientific; it is opposed to all superstitious ideas; it is empirical and does not respect as truth that which is not based on facts. Above all, it is nationalistic. The quintessence of this national culture is to be found in Iqbal.

Our national culture should uphold the dignity and independence of Pakistani nationhood. It belongs to our own nation and we must respect our own history. However, respect for history means respecting its dialectical development and not eulogizing the past at the expense of the present or praising every aspect of the "good old times". As far as the masses and young people are concerned, the essential thing is to guide them to look forward and not backward. The national culture must eradicate slavish mentality and colonial habits.

Actually, it is the question of outlook. Many of the officials, producers, writers, artists and intellectuals in charge of culture have a metaphysical reactionary pétit bourgeoisie and unscientific outlook. Many of the programmes on T.V. and in films and radio have lost their credibility. They are outdated and cannot take the society on the path of progress. The culture they depict is decadent and morbid. Its bankruptcy is manifested in the contradiction between its form and contents. Take for instance our films. Most of them are technically correct but their content is bogus. Many of them are indecently plagiarized.

The new cultural forces have made some strides in the domain of the social science, in arts and letters, military science and history but its influences have been all but powerful. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Allama Iqbal were the greatest and the most courageous standard-bearers of this new cultural force not only as men of letters but as great men of unyielding integrity and vision. Theirs was the road which leads to Pakistan's new national culture. Unfortunately, neither Sir Syed nor Allama Iqbal have left successors worthy of their name in the field of cultural renaissance. A firm struggle is necessary against all ideas opposed to unity and progress, and unless these reactionary ideas are crushed there will be no hope of victory.

In developing this modern culture, a high responsibility lies on the youth and on the women, particularly on the women. Under the Constitution of Pakistan, women have absolute equality with men. But a long shadow lies between the ideals of the Constitution and social practice. Everybody knows that in the early days of Islam, women fought side by side with men and were not reduced to a life of semi-voluntary penal servitude nor caught in an endless cycle of maternities. Family planning is not only necessary to reduce the number of children but to protect the health of women.

The women of Pakistan, chained to a life without hope, cannot play their full part in the country's welfare unless we can establish progressive ideas in all fields and defeat medieval reactionaries not only in the sphere of women's rights but also in politics. The oppression of women is part of the general problem of oppression; their emancipation will also be part of the general emancipation. If women are to be liberated, then it will be important to ensure that their children can be looked after while they are at work. Each place of work should have a nursery or kindergarten or playroom near home. Working women have begun to raise demands for facilities of the kind and are willing to fight for their rights. Crucial too is family planning, and this, in fact, requires education. The right to education and the right to work will be guaranteed to all women and to all men in Modern Pakistan.

Building a Modern Pakistan in our context cannot be equated with consumerism. A distinction will have to be made between wants and needs. Pakistan is a poor country and satisfaction of wants cannot be provided overnight. Only the satisfaction of needs is possible and that too at great costs. Nation-building does not mean more clothes, cars, refrigerators or T.V. The road which leads to nation-building is a long road and a difficult road. It winds uphill

all the way. Yet it must be recognized that the real question before the country is the economic question. The task is to build a system which will eradicate poverty. With organized hard work, the people of Pakistan can satisfy their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter and build a modern state. What is important is the construction of a system which will guarantee full employment to all Pakistanis on the principle from each according to his ability, to each according to his work ; which is part of our Constitution. This is the national task—to build a society which entails this principle.

THE TASK

What does our task mean in real terms?

In the field of politics it means the holding of periodical elections so that the people can exercise their choice freely about their representatives. It means the creation of new organs of power which are closer to the people. Historically, the system of local government developed by the British was based on lack of confidence. The police power, education, magistracy and irrigation department did not come under local government, which was a kind of kindergarten of politics. In order to develop resources, we need organs of the government where the local government actually becomes the government by the people. Of course, in the beginning these powers will be misused. There will be excesses. In time, however, the people will themselves correct the practice of local government. These are the essential steps, a beginning to a true democracy.

In the field of economics, we must introduce an organic plan with nation-building as its objective—a plan which will integrate the economic plan, the manpower plan, and the spatial plan in one coherent system. It may take a long time to reach that goal but at least the nation will know exactly where we are going.

The country has to travel along a critical path in order to reach the threshold of self-reliance. Without economic self-reliance, national independence is not possible : and unless national independence is achieved, we will continue to be a semi-colonial country; and until we end the semi-colonial structure, we have no guarantee of survival. Thus, modernisation is a necessary condition for survival.

Nor should we forget that we shall live in a world surrounded by citadels of reaction which have nuclear teeth. During the twentieth century, two attempts have been made to demonstrate that capitalism can be reformed and need not be destroyed: national socialism and the democratic state It is the latter that prevailed during the second world war due to the territorial ambitions inherent in the former. But who is to know that this victory is permanent.

To be sure, the demise of the present world economic order in the near future is certain, if it has not already taken plece, because of the simple reason that mass consumption and wasteful consumerism of highly developed imperialistic capitalism in which commodities are produced for profit and not use are outside the physical limits of world resources. But the forces of imperialism, the ruling classes might well try to postpone the final death pangs by another dose ofnaked imperialism and internal fascism. Before the world revolution comes, world reaction red in nuclear teeth and atomic claw could certainly make a final appearance. If it emerged on the stage of the world with the torch of liberty in hand, it may, while making its final exit, take off its mask with Hiroshima *mon anour* on its lips. International bureaucracy will send new ideas; offering a package deal in which the men who bring these ideas will be included. This will be the last assault on the world's developing countries.

Fortunately, it is too late for these conspiracies to succeed. It is much too difficult to watch over

all the potential leaders of national liberation. The task is gigantic and rather expensive. And now the masses are wise too. It is the task of the people of Pakistan to defend not only Pakistan but the rising aspirations of the Third World. It is the task for the committed to organize that defence.

Thus, the tasks that lie before us in building a democratic, modern, independent Pakistan, are immense. We will have to carry out a radical and intensive education and organizational work by dedicated cadres to accomplish this task. The major bottleneck to institutional change is the lack of competent and technically well-trained persons who can take command and direct work and supervise implementation.

Take the case of the peasants. The peasants have for a long time been tied to the land and have been engaged in production in a form that is scat ered. Their way of life is simple and individualistic. Thus, the ground is prepared for their lax ways and conservatism. Abstinence from work remains an attractive status symbol in agriculture and is a chronic malaise which leads to low agricultural yields. National independence requires that we produce our own food and our own machinery, educate all our children, electrify the villages, settle our quarrels and keep the peace. Before the horizon of self-reliance and national independence lies the task of the creation of self-sufficient, productive and free villages in our country, which will provide the basis for the new Pakistan.

Each field in every village is not a factor for peaceful production but a potential battlefield between landlords and tenants which already rages in the minds of the protagonists. At the centre of this lie the local officials : the petty despots in the form of lambardars, police and mukhtiarkars. While bowing before them the peasants in their heart of hearts curse them day and night.

Thus, the feudal tenure systems stand out as an institutional obstacle to agricultural improvement. No

revolution—red, green, blue or black—can be complete without a change in these relations. Ceiling legislation that has taken place under the land reforms so far is fully justified from the standpoint of social justice.

But in order to make progress towards a revolution the first task is to change the tenure system which saps the initiative of both landowner and tenant. This possibility was dismissed by the 1959 Land Commission in these words: "An ideal situation in our condition would be if the entire agricultural land could be operated through owner farmers or peasant proprietors. Ideals are, however, seldom obtainable and tenancy would continue to be a dominant feature of the tenure structure." But for how long ?

A rich peasant economy, or what might be called capitalist farming, is therefore the next stage of our advance. An alternative is the major consolidation of holdings and collective or state farming. Such an approach would not be welcomed by even the peasants who jealously guard their private title or even small plots of land. At the present level of social development, the landless, too, would not cooperate with this measure—as they too desire a piece of land. A fall in agricultural population is likely to result; and such a step is more likely to sabotage productivity than to advance it. A radical land redistribution is not a feasible alternative either, as neither the administrative resources nor the desire for these policies exists in the masses. Capitalist farming provides the best solution out of the impasse. It allows the progressive cultivators, big or small, to reap the full rewards of their enterprise and labour. A genuinely capitalist development of agriculture cannot tolerate feudal tenure ; that is, share-cropping in its present form. A fixed cash rent would be a better alternative for landlord and tenant both.

In "Socialism, Petty-Bourgeoisie and Proletarian" Lenin frankly advocated a capitalist development of agriculture as the first step in these words : "Is the

policy of land to the tiller a socialist policy ? The answer is no. It is a necessary concomitant of the democratic revolution and not directed against the bourgeois order, commodity production or capital. On the contrary, it is directed against the old, feudal, pre-capitalist relationships in the rural areas. Full victory of this peasant movement will not abolish capitalism; on the contrary, it wall hasten and intensify purely capitalist development of agriculture."

Thus, the initial policy after the 1917 Social Revolution was of capitalist farming. It was not until the 1930's, more than fifteen years after the revolution, that collectivisation was introduced at great human cost. In China, too, the first step was towards individual proprietorship. Same is the experience of Rumania, a predominantly agricultural country at the time of its 1944 socialist revolution. In the end, of course, cooperative farming or joint farming is the only solution to the agricultural problem. The luxury of having more than one opinion about this exists where huge holdings are possible, where each person can have 100 to 200 acres of land ; but within the framework of our own man-land ratio cooperative farming is the only eventual basis of a modernized agriculture. The road from feudal farming to cooperative farming lies through capitalist farming.

As for the industrial sector, true revolution means increased production. Backward countries are those where the majority of the people are engaged in agriculture. Thus industrialization is synonymous with progress in the long run. While we emphasize agriculture, we cannot lose sight of industrialization as the fundamental liberator of our national economy.

Above all, the people of Pakistan must beware of the utopians of the left and right with their textbook dogmas. Objectively speaking, the extreme "left" is in the hands of people who are asking for a premature

confrontation, who have divided up the workers and peasants into isolated little pockets; cell-politics has become the cancer eroding revolution. There is a desire to split and not unite, to intrigue and not be open. There is an emphasis on extreme slogans without deeds, leading to no results and probably to a premature decimation of all revolutionary forces in society. An early confrontation clearly suits the reactionary anti-people forces ; the earlier the better. Naturally, they would like a confrontation at a time and place suitable to them ; and the "extreme" left is cooperating in this plot. Whether they are doing so consciously or unconsciously has no relevance to the historical outcome. If their policies lead to reaction, history will call them the left reactionaries.

Then there is another kind of slogan that the factories and offices should become the property of the workers. This theory has nothing in common with a revolutionary outlook. The aim is to turn all the means of production *into the property of the whole people*, and that does not at all mean that the ships become the property of the ship workers or the banks the property of the bank clerks.

The basic economic necessity is the development of the forces of production. Our essential economic task, the direct object of our concern, is the ever fuller satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural requirements of our people, through continued development and improvement of production based on the highest technology. We can satisfy only needs ; not wants.

A lasting solution to the problem of poverty can only be found by a systematic transformation of our social system, our attitudes and institutions. There can be no substantial progress in our agriculture and food production or industrial development unless social institutions are adapted to the technical requirements of scientific agriculture and modernized

industry. All progressive societies have constantly been abandoning old traditions by adopting their institutional arrangements to new economic and political requirements ; in short, by modernisation of their attitudes, institutions, economics and politics. This can be achieved by following the principle of from each according to his ability, to each according to his work and a pattern of extended reproduction with a steady growth of national output not affected by crisis and slumps.

What is meant by the New Pakistan ? It means protection of private property ; organization of work or employment for all able-bodied men and women in factories and workshops ; equal labour duty for all members of society ; formation of youth corps capable of defence and development ; centralisation of the credit system and finance in the hands of the State ; increase in the number of socialised factories and workshops ; cultivation of all land and improvement of land already under cultivation in proportion to the capital and the workers at the disposal of the nation ; looking after the health and education of all children at the expense of the State ; continuation of education and productive work ; the building of an urban civilization without cities, i.e., *urbanisation of village life with community dwellings for citizens, who should pursue industry as well as agriculture and enjoy the advantages of urban as well as rural life without the one-sidedness and disadvantages of either* ; replacement of all unhealthy and badly built dwellings and town quarters with hygienic and clean living ; concentration of all means of transport in the hands of the nation. This is indeed a long journey ; but the first few steps have been taken. Enterprises such as banks, railways and airlines, which are either monopolistic in character or too big for private management, are now operated and administered by the State, so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the

people. The State enterprises now constitute the leading force in the whole national economy.

In constructing Modern Pakistan, the first stage is to build a sound agricultural foundation of surplus ; the second stage is to build an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system ; the third stage is to accomplish a comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence, science and technology. Upon achieving these results, we will have entered the modern age.

The unification of our country and the unity of the peoples who inhabit our various provinces—these are fundamental tasks.

Such a unity can be reconstructed on the edifice of the history of the Indus. Muslim civilization is not the first opponent of Brahmanism witnessed by the Indus Valley. It was preceded by Hellenism and Buddhism. No less an authority on culture than Andre Malraux* writes: "The Greek and the Buddhist ...were not without a common language; for though Asiatic, Buddhism is not oriental. The langorous grace of its kneeling women, with the white roses of Kashmir and the Gandhara drooping between their clasped hands...had nothing of the oriental's groveling before a fear-compelling presence. While Greece bade man confront destiny on equal terms, Buddhism aspired to show him, at least, a way of escape from destiny. It aimed at liberating man from the tyranny of his desires...Hellenism and Buddhism had common enemies...Brahmanism... Preached under the auspices of the Greek King Menander and the Indo-Scythian King Kanishka".

The liberation of man from the "tyranny of his desires" is also one of the essential messages of sufism. The mystic concept that man must fulfil no more than his needs is as modern a concept as "limits

* Andre Malraux. "The Voices of Silence", Paladin, London, 1974, p. 149

to growth". In the Holy Quran it is stated that God created Adam "in his own form" and thus intelligence, will and speech are clad in divinity. The concept of unity of all mankind living under one world government as the final goal.

The message of Islam came into the subcontinent through the path of mysticism. Tasawwuf was its standard bearer, and shariat its formal requirement. Some of the sufis claim that the roots of tasawwuf lie in the Quran: "Allah is the rich and ye the poor" (XL VII-38). The various states of the mystic way are repentence (tawbah), self-restraint (wara), abstinence (zuhd), poverty (faqr), patience (sabr), reliance (tawakkul), and acceptance (riza). What Aldous Huxley has described as the perennial philosophy is contained in the mystic vision: "All that is on earth is perishing, but there abides the face of thy lord full of majesty and beauty."

Thus, the suppression of greed and of unnecessary consumer wants and the submergence of the self in the organic totality of the nation in particular and of mankind who inhabit our small planet in general has to be an essential aspect of our culture. One who is empty of riches may be poor; but he who is empty of unnecessary material wants is truly rich. In Kashful-Mahjub*, the greatest of the Pakistani mystics, Data Ganj Bakhsh (the bestower of treasures), said: "Sufism is the renunciation of all selfish prayers"; and he mentions "the poverty of Prophet Mohammad to whom God Almighty sent the key of all the treasures that are upon the face of the earth... and he answered, "O Lord ! I desire them not; keep me one day full fed and one day hungry." This is the spirit required for nation-building.

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* "Kashful Mahjub", translated by Nicholson, Islamic Book Foundation, Lahore, 1976, pp. 37 and 40.

CONCLUSION

IN this book an attempt has been made to trace the evolution of the concept of Pakistan. At the core of this concept is the theory, postulated by Mr. Jinnah, that the Hindus and Muslims of the South-Asian subcontinent constitute not one but two nations. From the initial demand for "safeguards", of qualifying the terms on which power was to be exercised by the majority, the Muslims evolved the two-nation theory which transmutes the ideology of "minorities" and of "safeguard" ; to the final demand for transfer of power to a separate state where they would be in a majority.

"I was, therefore, led to ask myself", reports the Reforms Commissioner to the Government of India, in January 1942, "what is the element in Muslim thought which finds expression in Pakistan? It derives, it seemed to me, from the allied concepts of 'minority' and 'safeguard'. Experience under the Congress governments may have been the stimulus, but the real motive goes deeper. Nor does it lie only in the recognition that safeguards depend for their efficiency upon the presence of a third power to enforce them...It lies more profoundly, though perhaps less consciously, in the knowledge that 'safeguards' are designed to improve, but cannot radically alter the position of a majority, which remains a minority, a Cinderella with trade-union rights and a radio in the kitchen but still below stairs. It is against this whole combination of ideas that the Muslim mind rebels".* Thus the demand for

* Report of the Reforms Commissioner in "The Transfer of Power, 1942—47" Volume 1, HMSO, London, 1970, pp. 66-67

Pakistan was for separate state where the Muslims would be in a *majority* and would no longer seek safeguards which only a minority requires.

While the conversion of a minority into a majority is the essence of the Pakistan concept, this is not the only feature of the two-nation theory. Great pains were taken by Mr. Jinnah and others to elucidate that the Muslims were a separate nation in the modern sense, differentiated by language and culture as the following quotations bear out:

"Despite all the safeguards and guarantees we have had in the past, the very name of our national language, Urdu—the *lingua franca* of the Indian sub-continent—has been wiped out of the list of Indian languages".[1]

"As the Urdu language was originally an Indian language and was the result of inter-action of Hindu and Muslim culture and it was spoken by a great part of the people of this country, it was best suited to develop a united nationality, and the attempt to replace it by Hindi might upset Urdu otherwise known as Hindustani and adversely affect the growth of comradeship between the Hindu and Muslim sections ..."[2]

In his Presidential Address at the Lahore session of the League in 1940, Mr. Jinnah said:

"It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religious in the strict sense of the word but are, in fact, different and

1 "Now or Never" : Ch. Rahmat Ali (1933), Mohammad Aslam Khan Khattak, Sh. Mohammad Sadiq, Inayatullah Khan. Qoated in' "Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents", G. Allana, Paradise Subscription Agency, p. 109.

2 Resolution on Urdu adopted at the annual session of the League at Allahabad on 18-10-1937.

distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever weld a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of your troubles...The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither inter-marry nor interdine together. They belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspect on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that the Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspiration from different sources in history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes.

"History has presented to us many examples, such as the Union of Great Britain and Ireland, Czechoslovakia and Poland. History has also shown us many tracts much smaller than the subcontinent of India, which otherwise might have been called one country, but which have been divided into as many states as there are nations inhabiting them. Balkan Peninsula comprises as many as to 8 sovereign states. Likewise the Portuguese and the Spanish stand divided in the Iberian Peninsula".*

We have now taken into account three essentials of the two-nation theory. First, that the Muslims would, as a result of this theory, be transmuted from a minority to a majority in areas comprising Pakistan ; second, that the Muslims had a distinct national language in Urdu ; third, the difference between Islam and Hinduism is not only in the strict religious sense but in the sense of differences in culture.

A fourth ingredient in the two-nation theory was

* "Pakistan Movement : Historic Documents", G. Allana, Paradise Subscription Agency, Karachi, pp. 187-188.

that whereas Hinduism is the citadel of prejudice and discrimination, Pakistani society would recognize the equality of all men. The Quaid-i-Azam's outlook of a Pakistan free of prejudice and discrimination was directly juxtaposed to the doctrines of Hinduism which sanctify discrimination. In this quest for equality the Muslims were not alone.

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar remarks in *What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables* published in 1946 in the following words : "Barring the illusory campaign against untouchability, Gandhism is simply another form of Sanatanism which is the ancient name for militant orthodox Hinduism. What is there in Gandhism which is not to be found in orthodox Hinduism ? There is caste in Gandhism. Hinduism believes in the law of hereditary profession, so does Gandhism. Hinduism enjoins cow-worship. So does Gandhism. Hinduism upholds the law of Karma, predestination of man's condition in this world, so does Gandhism. Hinduism believes in *avatars* or incarnations of God. So does Gandhism. Hinduism believes in idols, so does Gandhism. Hinduism is a 'chamber of horrors' ".*

As opposed to this, Muslims of India fervently believed in the equality of man. That Pakistan was to be a society free of discrimination where everybody would be a first class citizen is borne out by Quaid-i-Azam's address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, when he said:

"We should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people and especially of the masses and of the poor ... We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination ... We are starting

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* Quoted in Dobbin, "Basic Documents in the Development of Modern India and Pakistan, 1835—1947" Van Nostiand Reinhold Company, London, 1970, p. 112

with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state".*

As long as the impurity of discrimination persists in our social fabric, there will be discontent, for unequal treatment of its citizens is contrary to the concept of Pakistan itself.

Finally, the common task of all citizens of the state is to establish the well-being of the masses by a process of modernization and to construct a society which provides for liberty, equality and fraternity. Such a reconstruction can only take place through unity, faith and discipline and through still more sacrifices.

The history of Pakistan has been compared to the myth of Sisyphus. This allusion to Greece is by no means strange. Hellenism and Buddhism, says Malraux, had common enemies in Brahmanism and that synthesis gave rise to the language of Gandhara, which combines the languorous grace of the East with the classicism of the West. The Modern Hellenism of the West and Islam combined, against the same enemy, in the Anglo-Mohammadan Oriental College, but failed to perfect a common language, culture or civilizaton. Thus more appropriate a simile than a Greek myth is an episode from Greek history. A broken journey, long ago. Alexander travels westward down the Indus and melts into the sun before he can return to the source of contemporary civilization. Our journey, too, appears to be inexplicably interrupted before time, before distance. Temporary disruptions cannot obstruct; the uphill path cannot prevent the surge towards Renaissance for today there is only one civilization with Hellenic roots.

* Quoted in "Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents", pp. 409-410

Reaction, obscurantism, superstition might appear in many a garb be ore their final exit from the planet's stage, but the third quarter of the twentieth century will be its epilogue. The people of Pakistan will follow Alexander's path to the West and complete the virtuous circle, for our final objectives are no different from those of Ataturk's revolution. To bring our people to the level of contemporary civilization represents fulfilment of the Pakistan movement as of other countries of the Third World. The Third World aspires for One World.

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